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Abstract 
Using decadal census data since 1960, I cannot reject the hypothesis that new immigrants crowd out 
existing residents from US commuting zones and states one-for-one. My estimate is precise and robust 
to numerous specifications, as well as accounting for local dynamics; and I show how it can be 
reconciled with apparently conflicting results in the literature. Exploiting my model's structure, I 
attribute 30% of the observed effect to mismeasurement, specifically undercoverage of immigrants. 
Based on a remarkably simple decomposition, I show that population mobility accounts for 90% of 
local adjustment, and labor demand the remainder. These results have important methodological 
implications for the estimation of immigration effects. 
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1 Introduction
Recent years have seen growing interest in the geographical mobility of labor, as collapsing
manufacturing employment exacerbates regional inequalities (Autor, Dorn and Hanson,
2013; Charles, Hurst and Notowidigdo, 2016). An important tension in this discussion
is the apparent inconsistency between migratory responses to different shocks. On the
one hand, economists mostly agree that local population responds strongly (though not
instantaneously) to labor demand (e.g. Blanchard and Katz, 1992; Monras, 2015; Amior
and Manning, 2018). But, it is commonly believed that local supply shocks driven by
immigration elicit little such response: see e.g. Card (2001). As it happens, this latter
result underpins much of the empirical immigration literature: many studies exploit local
variation in the incidence of immigration to identify its effects (see Lewis and Peri, 2015,
and Jaeger, Ruist and Stuhler, 2018, for excellent surveys); but this strategy is typically
only feasible if mobility responds sluggishly (Borjas, Freeman and Katz, 1997).
This paper attempts to reconcile these results, using decadal US census data on 722
commuting zones (CZs) over 50 years. Like Amior and Manning (2018), I take a “semi-
structural” approach to estimation which accounts explicitly for dynamic local adjust-
ment. This allows me to study very general settings, without imposing heavy structural
assumptions or relying on natural experiments (which restrict analysis to specific historic
episodes). Identifying my model with shift-share instruments, I find that for each new
foreign arrival to a CZ (over one decade), 1.1 existing residents leave on net contempora-
neously, with a standard error of just 0.1. This effect is remarkably precise and robust to
numerous specification choices, and even the OLS estimate is very large (0.76). It is also
educationally “balanced”: the college share of both foreign inflows and net outflows re-
semble the local population. And similarly to Dustmann, Schoenberg and Stuhler (2017),
it is driven by a reduction in internal inflows rather than larger outflows (and hence my
preference for the “crowd-out” terminology over the more typical “displacement”). I base
my main estimates on CZs, but I also cannot reject perfect crowd-out across states.
Though one may expect a significant response, its sheer size is puzzling - for two
reasons. First, it conflicts with much of the literature (as I describe below), and a
key contribution of this paper will be to reconcile these results. Second, my estimates
even lack internal consistency: I identify small but significant negative effects of foreign
inflows on local employment rates, especially among the low educated. This suggests
local adjustment is incomplete, which is difficult to reconcile with perfect crowd-out.
I attribute the latter inconsistency to mismeasurement - specifically, undercoverage of
immigrants in the census. The structure of my model allows me to identify the extent of
undercoverage. Purging the associated bias reduces my crowd-out estimate from 1.1 to
0.8. I attribute the bulk of the remaining 0.8 effect to the labor market. Though labor
demand (itself mediated by the housing market) does cushion the impact of immigration,
1
I find that population mobility accounts for 90% of the recovery of local welfare. The
dominant role of population mobility is consistent with what we know about local ad-
justment following labor demand shocks (as cited above). Methodologically, exploiting
my model, I show how the contributions of internal mobility and labor demand to local
adjustment can be quantified in a simple way, without any information on local wages or
prices, and without having to impose any parameter values ex ante. This is useful because
local wage deflators are notoriously difficult to construct and rely on heavy theoretical
assumptions: see e.g. Koo, Phillips and Sigalla (2000), Albouy (2008) and Phillips and
Daly (2010).
Turning to the existing literature, I am not the first to identify large crowd-out (see
Filer, 1992; Frey, 1995; 1996; Borjas, Freeman and Katz, 1997; Hatton and Tani, 2005;
Borjas, 2006, 2014); though Wright, Ellis and Reibel (1997) dispute Frey’s methods, and
Peri and Sparber (2011) and Card and Peri (2016) dispute Borjas’. Still, even Borjas’
(2006) estimates are smaller than mine: he finds that each immigrant crowds out 0.6
natives from US metro areas, and 0.3 from states. In a study of the Mariel Boatlift,
Monras (forthcoming) estimates that internal mobility accounts for about half of local
adjustment - again, significantly less than my own estimate. Monras (2020) also estimates
large crowd-out following an unanticipated surge of Mexican migration, but finds much
less over the decadal census intervals which I study. Applying a structural model to
local wage data, Colas (2018) finds that crowd-out reaches 0.5 ten years after a one-off
immigration shock. Burstein et al. (2020) show that migrants crowd out natives from
non-tradable jobs, though this is a within-CZ effect. Abramitzky et al. (2019) study the
effect of lost foreign labor (following the 1920s imposition of border controls): in affected
urban areas, this labor was fully replaced through population inflows; but in rural areas, it
triggered large net outflows of native-born workers. Finally, Dustmann, Schoenberg and
Stuhler (2017) find that Czech cross-border commuters crowded out German nationals
one-for-one in local employment in the early 1990s, with a third of the effect (over three
years) coming through internal migration.
Still, the US literature more typically reports small negative or even positive effects
on native population: see Butcher and Card (1991), White and Imai (1994), Wright,
Ellis and Reibel (1997), Card and DiNardo (2000), Card (2001, 2005, 2007), Card and
Lewis (2007), Cortes (2008), Boustan, Fishback and Kantor (2010), Peri and Sparber
(2011), Wozniak and Murray (2012), Hong and McLaren (2015), Edo and Rapoport
(2019) and Piyapromdee (forthcoming); see also Pischke and Velling (1997) on Germany,
and Sanchis-Guarner (2017) on Spain. These results are often rationalized by an elastic
local demand for labor (which absorbs the new migrants), driven either by technological
change or local consumption (Lewis, 2011; Dustmann and Glitz, 2015; Hong and McLaren,
2015). Consistent with these claims, I find employment is indeed very responsive to (total)
local population. But since population itself adjusts so quickly, I find the labor demand
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response has little traction over the path of adjustment - at least in this setting.
So, how can my results be reconciled with the literature? While I pool 50 years of
data, a number of papers rely on much shorter horizons; and as Borjas, Freeman and Katz
(1997) argue, such estimates are sensitive to the particular pattern of omitted shocks in
any given decade. Indeed, with no controls, my estimates of crowd-out vary greatly by
decade (consistent with the existing literature). But once I control for initial conditions
and observable supply/demand shocks, the estimates are much more consistent over time
- and I cannot reject perfect crowd-out in any decade. I also show the inclusion of arguably
endogenous controls in previous studies may play a role.
Still, while I focus on cross-CZ variation, much of the literature exploits variation
across skill groups within areas (e.g. Card and DiNardo, 2000; Card, 2001, 2005; Borjas,
2006; Cortes, 2008; Monras, 2020): i.e. they study the effect of skill-specific immigration
on local skill composition. But small composition effects are not inconsistent with large
crowd-out at the aggregate level - for two reasons. First, composition effects reflect not
only differential internal mobility, but also changes in the character of local birth cohorts.
Indeed, I show that cohort effects have historically offset the contribution of mobility (in
the determination of local skill composition). And second, within-area estimates do not
account for the economic impact that new migrants exert outside their own skill group
(see Card, 2001; Dustmann, Schoenberg and Stuhler, 2016). This can be seen in the
remarkable sensitivity of my within-area estimates to the delineation of these skill groups.
These insights allow me to reconcile my results with this literature.
Finally, this paper highlights the importance of census undercoverage. Though there
have been attempts to measure undercoverage of undocumented migrants (see e.g. Van Hook
and Bean, 1998b, for an excellent survey), there has been little discussion of the impli-
cations (whether qualitative or quantitative) for estimating the effects of immigration.
As I discuss below, neither reduced form nor structural estimates are immune from these
concerns. Here, I offer a means to quantify the bias using the census data alone. Ex-
ploiting my model’s structure, I show that controlling for employment growth (in the
crowd-out equation) effectively partials out the bias in foreign inflows. An estimate of
the employment elasticity is then sufficient to identify the undercount - which I place
at about 30%. Variation across census years is consistent with these claims: I estimate
double the crowd-out before 1980, when coverage was known to poorer. But as the model
predicts, once I condition on employment, crowd-out varies little over time.
To summarize, this paper makes four contributions:
1. Estimation of an empirically robust one-for-one crowd-out effect, based on a model
which accounts for sluggish adjustment and local dynamics.
2. Identification of significant undercoverage bias in US census data, which accounts
for about 30% of the crowd-out effect.
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3. A novel (and remarkably simple) approach to decomposing local adjustment into
contributions from internal mobility (90%) and labor demand (10%), which requires
no information on wages or prices, and does not impose any parameter values ex
ante. The dominant role of population mobility is consistent with evidence on
adjustment to local demand shocks.
4. Reconciliation of my crowd-out estimates with existing studies which exploit both
cross-area and within-area (cross-skill) variation.
In Section 2, I set out my model and derive my estimating equations. Section 3 describes
the data. Section 4 presents my main crowd-out estimates and assesses the credibility
of my identification strategy. I also study the impact of immigration on employment
rates, wages and housing costs. Section 5 assesses the implications of undercoverage for
my results and the decomposition of local adjustment. And in Section 6, I subject my
results to numerous robustness checks, and attempt to reconcile them with the existing
literature. The Online Appendices contain theoretical derivations and numerous empirical
sensitivity tests, as well as reconciliations with two classic studies of crowd-out in Card
(2001) and Card (2007).
2 Model of local crowding out
2.1 Overview
Like Amior and Manning (2018), my theoretical framework consists of two components:
(i) a Roback (1982) style model for local labor market equilibrium, conditional on popu-
lation, and (ii) dynamic equations describing local population adjustment. In this paper,
I develop this framework to explore the local impact of immigration.
This impact is moderated by two local adjustment mechanisms: (i) internal mobility
and (ii) an expansion of labor demand. As I will show, the contributions of each can be
quantified using estimates of “unconditional” and “conditional” crowd-out. Unconditional
crowd-out is the impact of foreign inflows on net internal outflows, an object with long
precedent in the literature (though I respecify it to account for dynamic adjustment).
Conditional crowd-out also describes the impact on net internal outflows, but this time
holding labor demand (identified by total employment) fixed. By comparing the two, I
can identify the contribution of labor demand to local adjustment.
This paper is closely related to Amior (2020), but addresses a different set of questions.
Here, I take foreign inflows to local labor markets as given, and I study the implications
for local population, employment and welfare. In contrast, Amior (2020) takes local
(demand-driven) employment growth as given, and studies the determination of new
immigrants’ location choices and their contribution to population adjustment (similar to
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Borjas, 2001 and Cadena and Kovak, 2016). Both papers rely on the conditional crowd-
out equation. But the unconditional equation is particular to this paper: by comparing
the two, this paper seeks to unravel the direct (first order) effects of immigration shocks.
For simplicity, I assume in the model that native and migrant labor are identical and
perfect substitutes. The existing literature does typically (though not unanimously) find
they are close substitutes, both within skill cells and at the aggregate level.1 But I do not
impose perfect substitutability on my empirical specifications. Rather, I consider this
assumption’s validity ex post, following a strategy proposed by Beaudry, Green and Sand
(2012). In practice, it turns out that immigration does exert similar effects on native
and migrant employment rates, which is consistent with the model’s assumptions. In a
similar spirit, I do not account for skill heterogeneity here; but see Appendix A.4 for an
exposition which does, and see Section 6.3 for associated empirical estimates. Another
possible source of heterogeneity is monopsony: if firms enjoy greater market power over
migrants than natives, they may exploit immigration by extracting more rents from
native and migrant labor alike (Amior and Manning, 2020). For simplicity, I have chosen
to assume a competitive market in this exposition; but I argue in Section 4.2 that this
mechanism may help account for the large mobility response to immigration.
In what follows, I first derive an estimable equation for conditional crowd-out. I then
solve for local employment growth and derive my unconditional crowd-out specification.
And finally, I show how one can decompose the contributions of internal mobility and
labor demand to local adjustment (following a given immigration shock), using estimated
coefficients from the conditional and unconditional equations.
2.2 Local equilibrium conditional on population
Suppose there is a single traded good, with price P , and a non-traded good (housing)







Next, let Nr and Lr denote local employment and population. The standard Roback
(1982) model assumes labor supply is fixed, so there is no meaningful difference between
1Ottaviano and Peri (2012) estimate an elasticity of substitution between natives and migrants of 20
within skill cells. Card (2009) finds even larger numbers, and Borjas, Grogger and Hanson (2012) and
Ruist (2013) cannot reject perfect substitutability. At the aggregate level (which is the relevant point
here), differences in native and migrant skill composition will also matter. Migrants do have similar
college shares to natives in the US (Card, 2009), but they are disproportionately represented among high
school dropouts. The latter point is only pertinent if high school dropouts and graduates are imperfect
substitutes: Card (2009) and Ottaviano and Peri (2012) cannot reject perfect substitutability, though
this conclusion is disputed by Borjas, Grogger and Hanson (2012). Note also that these skill share
estimates may be biased by undercoverage (see below).
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them. But suppose labor supply is somewhat elastic to the real consumption wage:
nr = lr + εs (wr − pr) + zsr (2)
where lower case denotes logs. wr is the log nominal wage, and zsr is a local supply shifter.
I write labor demand as:
nr = −εd (wr − p) + zdr (3)
where zdr is a demand shifter. In Appendix A.2, I set out equations for housing supply
and demand. Together with (1)-(3), I can then solve for employment, wages and prices
as functions of population lr alone. Finally, I write indirect utility as:
vr = wr − pr + ar (4)
where wr − pr is the real consumption wage, and ar local amenities. Crucially, I can now
replace the real wage in (4) with the the labor supply equation (2). This allows me to





(nr − lr − zsr) + ar (5)
The elimination of real wages is useful because local wage deflators are notoriously difficult
to construct (and rely on strong theoretical assumptions), especially for the detailed
geographies and long time horizons I study (see Koo, Phillips and Sigalla, 2000; Albouy,
2008; Phillips and Daly, 2010); whereas employment rates are easily measured in the
census data. Amior and Manning (2018) show this “sufficient statistic” result is robust to
the inclusion of multiple traded and non-traded sectors (where migrants will generate their
own local demand), agglomeration, endogenous amenities and labor market frictions; and
it is also robust to heterogeneity in the consumer price indices of natives and migrants (as
in Albert and Monras, 2018).2 Another concern is heterogeneous preferences for leisure:
I address this empirically by adjusting employment rates for demographic composition.
2.3 Population dynamics
Long run equilibrium is characterized by spatially invariant utility vr, which determines
population lr in every area r. Like Amior and Manning (2018), I allow for population
to adjust sluggishly to this equilibrium; but I distinguish between the contributions of
internal and foreign migration:
dlr = λIr + λFr (6)
2Suppose natives and migrants weight local prices differently in utility. The labor supply of natives
will depend on their price index, and similarly for migrants. But this means I can still replace both
natives’ and migrants’ real consumption wages with the employment rate (in their respective utility
functions), at least after adjusting employment rates for demographic composition.
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where λIr is the instantaneous rate of net internal inflows (i.e from elsewhere in the US),
and λFr is the foreign inflow rate, relative to local population. (6) does not account for
emigration, but I consider this later when interpreting the estimates. Using a logit model
of residential choice (see e.g. Appendix A of Amior, 2020), λIr can be expressed as a linear
function of utility vr:
λIr = γ (nr − lr − zsr + εsar) (7)
where γ ≥ 0 is the elasticity of net internal flows. I have not included a national intercept,
but the supply effect zsr may be redefined to include one. Mobility decisions in (7) depend
only on current outcomes, so workers are implicitly myopic. However, Amior and Manning
(2018) show that a model with forward-looking agents yields an equivalent expression,
where the γ parameter depends on both mobility and the local persistence of shocks.
In Amior (2020), where I study the location choices of new immigrants, I set out
a parallel expression for foreign inflows, λFr . This depends partly on what I call the
“foreign intensity”, i.e. the foreign inflow in the absence of local utility differentials.
Crucially, the foreign intensity varies regionally, partly due to the size of migrant enclaves
(which offer e.g. language or job access benefits). Since it does not enter the internal
mobility equation (7) directly, this yields an exclusion restriction which motivates the
classic “enclave instrument” of Altonji and Card (1991) and Card (2001). But, I do not
model λFr formally in this paper: my interest here is the evolution of internal flows λIr for
given λFr .
2.4 Conditional crowd-out
I now derive an estimable equation for conditional crowd-out, which describes the effect
of foreign inflows λFr on (net) internal flows λIr, holding the level of labor demand fixed.
I first substitute (7) for internal flows λIr in (6):
dlr = λFr + γ (nr − lr − zsr + εsar) (8)
For estimation, I require a discrete-time expression. Suppose the foreign inflow λFr is
constant within decadal intervals; and suppose also the supply effect zsr , amenity ar and




















r (τ) dτ is the discrete-time internal response over the unit interval, and
λFrt is the discrete foreign inflow. Conditional on employment growth ∆nrt (which fixes
labor demand), the initial conditions (the lagged employment rate) and amenity/supply
shocks, (9) describes the impact of foreign inflows λFrt on net internal inflows λIrt. This
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effect increases from 0 to -1 as the internal population elasticity γ increases from 0 to∞.
Notice the demand shifter ∆zdrt does not appear in this equation: due to the sufficient
statistic result, employment growth and the lagged rate account fully for the welfare
effects of local labor market dynamics (conditional on the supply/amenity effects).
Equation (9) is implicitly an error correction model in population and employment.
This can be seen by adding foreign inflows λFrt to both sides. The dependent variable
then becomes the log population change ∆lrt, which is a linear function of the log em-
ployment change ∆nrt and the lagged log employment rate nrt−1 − lrt−1 (i.e. the initial
steady-state deviation). As γ becomes large, we approach full adjustment over decadal
intervals: contemporaneous employment growth manifests one-for-one in population; and
the coefficient on nrt−1 − lrt−1 goes to 1, so any initial employment rate deviations are
eliminated by population change in the subsequent interval.
Notice the coefficients on λFrt and ∆nrt are pure functions of γ, and identical up to
their sign. This is because both λFrt and ∆nrt, conditional on the other, mechanically
feed one-for-one into local employment rates (and therefore into local utility vrt); and γ
represents the pure mobility response to local utility. In practice though, estimates of the
λFrt coefficient will exceed that of ∆nrt if there is native distaste for immigration (as in
Card, Dustmann and Preston, 2012; Saiz and Wachter, 2011; Fernandez-Huertas Moraga,
Ferrer-i Carbonell and Saiz, 2019): effectively, this would generate a negative correlation
between λFrt and an (unobserved) amenity change ∆art.
2.5 Unconditional crowd-out
Equation (9) does not describe the unconditional impact of foreign inflows, as I am
controlling for employment growth ∆nrt (which fixed labor demand); and labor demand
may be a key margin of adjustment. To derive the unconditional effect (where this paper
and Amior, 2020, diverge), I now reduce ∆nrt to its determinants.
This requires a model of the housing market, as local prices shift labor supply (2)
but not demand (3). Assuming people spend a fixed share of their income on housing
(i.e. Cobb-Douglas utility), Appendix A.2 shows that changes in local prices pr can be
specified as:





(∆nrt −∆lrt −∆zsrt) + ∆nrt
]
(10)
where the parameter κ > 0 goes to infinity with the elasticity of housing supply.3 Given
the labor supply and demand equations, employment growth can then be written as:








ν , where ν is the income share spent on housing, and ε
hs











is the elasticity of employment to local population. η is bounded by 0 and 1 if labor
demand slopes down (i.e. εd > 0) and labor supply up (εs > 0). η captures the sum of all
local adjustment mechanisms, conditional on population. In particular, η is increasing in
the wage elasticity εd of labor demand (relative to labor supply εs): in a more complete
model, εd will capture the extent of capital mobility and local demand for non-tradables.4
Similarly, one would expect a larger employment response η to population if housing
supply is more elastic (i.e. κ larger).5 Intuitively, this should ensure local prices are less
sensitive to foreign inflows; and this should moderate any negative effect on real wages,
labor supply in (2), and labor demand in equilibrium. I have assumed here that the labor
and housing market elasticities are fixed and constant: to the extent they are non-linear
or vary regionally (as in e.g. Glaeser and Gyourko, 2005), my empirical estimates should
be treated as average linearized effects.
As I show in Appendix A.3, substituting (11) for employment growth ∆nrt in the

























) (nrt−1 − lrt−1 − zsrt−1 + εsart−1)
Compared to the conditional equation (9), employment growth ∆nrt has been replaced
with the exogenous demand shifter ∆zdrt.
2.6 Relationship between crowd-out equations
To clarify how the crowd-out equations are related, notice the conditional crowd-out and
employment equations, i.e. (9) and (11), form a two-equation system. This become
clearer once I abstract from the lagged employment rate and amenity/supply controls6:






4Immigrants will of course support local demand through consumption (e.g. Hong and McLaren,
2015). Though I do not account for this effect above, it is observationally equivalent to a flatter labor
demand curve; and it will return identical estimating equations: see Amior and Manning (2018).
5The employment elasticity η is increasing in κ (and therefore in the housing supply elasticity) if
εd > 1. This condition ensures that immigration causes the local wage bill (and therefore housing
demand) to grow, in the absence of a mobility response.
6One may interpret the remaining variables as residuals, conditional on these controls.
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There are two exogenous inputs (the foreign inflow λFrt and local demand shifter ∆zdrt) and
two endogenous outputs (the net internal flow λIrt and employment growth ∆nrt). Based
on (9), δc1 → 1 and δc2 → 1 as the population elasticity γ → ∞. Note the basic model
predicts δc1 = δc2; but for the reasons discussed above, I do not impose this condition.
The unconditional crowd-out equation (13) is a “reduced form” specification:
λIrt = −δu1λFrt + δu2 ∆zdrt (16)
which collapses λIrt to the exogenous variables, λFrt and zdrt. Given this, unconditional





which is smaller than the conditional effect δc1, for employment elasticity η > 0. Intu-
itively, the conditional effect δc1 describes the counterfactual mobility response to a foreign
inflow λFrt, in the absence of a labor demand response. If η = 0, the unconditional effect
δu1 will therefore equal δc1. But as η expands, the employment response to immigration
becomes increasingly positive: this will moderate any adverse welfare effects7, and un-
conditional crowd-out δu1 will contract. In the limit, as η → 1, adjustment is fully effected
by changes in local employment rather than population; so δu1 → 0 (zero crowd-out).
Crucially though, as the population elasticity γ increases, the contribution of employ-
ment through η recedes. In the limit, as γ → ∞ (so δc1 → 1), internal mobility will
account for the entirety of local adjustment, irrespective of the value of η: as (17) shows,
unconditional crowd-out δu1 will equal 1; so employment will remain static. Intuitively,
even if employment is responsive to local population (due to the housing and labor market
elasticities), this will have little traction if population itself adjusts very quickly.
2.7 Identification of mobility and labor demand responses
What is the impact of a one-off foreign inflow on local welfare? What are the contributions
of internal mobility and labor demand to local adjustment? And how can we identify
them? As I now show, the sufficient statistic result facilitates a remarkably simple and
intuitive decomposition of the welfare effects of (i) the foreign inflow, (ii) the mobility
response (via the γ elasticity) and (iii) the labor demand response (via the η elasticity,
itself mediated by the housing market). This decomposition relies on estimates of the
conditional and unconditional crowd-out equations alone: it requires no information on
wages or prices, and imposes no ex ante values on housing or labor market elasticities.
7This moderating effect is contingent on labor demand sloping down (i.e. εd > 0): see (12). Otherwise,
η may turn negative, in which case population growth would perversely cause employment to contract
in comparative statics (though equilibrium would be unstable). Of course, agglomeration is crucial to
the existence of cities. But if these returns never peter out, population adjustment cannot return the
system to equilibrium.
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I focus for now on the contemporaneous welfare response, and return to the dynamics
below. Given the sufficient statistic result, the overall (contemporaneous) welfare effect of
an immigration shock (up to any amenity effect) can be summarized by the employment


























where the first term (the -1) represents the counterfactual impact of the immigration
shock, in the absence of any mobility response (i.e. γ = 0) or any employment response
(i.e. η = 0, such that labor demand is perfectly inelastic).8 The second term (δu1 )
describes the internal mobility response (i.e. unconditional crowd-out). And the final
term describes the employment response, for given population. This can be identified by
the difference between conditional and unconditional crowd-out (δc1− δu1 ): this is because
δc1 holds labor demand fixed, while δu1 does not.
This is a remarkably simple and intuitive (and easily estimable) decomposition. In
innovative work, Monras (forthcoming) attempts a similar exercise (applied to the Mariel
Boatlift), but takes a different approach. He evaluates local welfare using wages; and to
translate between the immigration shock (expressed in stocks) and prices, he parameter-
izes equations for labor demand, housing demand and housing supply. But since I write
everything in stocks (by relying on the sufficient statistic result), I do not need to make
assumptions about these parameters. In fact, my decomposition is overidentified: as (18)
shows, I can predict the (unconditional) employment rate effect using estimates of the
crowd-out equations; but I can also estimate the employment rate effect directly. This is
a useful check on the model; and as I show below, I cannot reject its implicit restrictions.
Crucially, the contributions of mobility and employment to adjustment influence one
another; and the crowd-out equation parameters allow me to characterize this interde-









where the mobility response is identified by δc1 (since the conditional equation holds labor
demand fixed). This is larger than the actual response (equal to δu1 in (18)), because an
elastic labor demand moderates the welfare impact of the shock along the adjustment
8Since the employment rate contracts by 1 point in this counterfactual, the real wage wr−pr declines
by 1εs : see the labor supply equation (2).
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δc2 (1− δu1 )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Emp response
(20)
where the final term identifies the elasticity of employment to population, i.e. η. Again,
this is larger than the actual employment response in (18), because the mobility response
reduces the supply of labor (and hence employment growth) over the adjustment path.
In practice though, I will argue this simple decomposition is infeasible because of
undercoverage of migrants in the data. Without knowing the size of the bias ex ante, I
cannot identify both the employment response and the extent of undercoverage using the
crowd-out equations alone. However, as I discuss in Section 5, identification is feasible if
I additionally exploit the restrictions implied by the employment equation (15).
I have focused here on the contemporaneous adjustment to an immigration shock.
But to the extent this adjustment is incomplete, the dynamics will also play a role. In
the absence of new immigration shocks, population will decline over time (according to
the coefficient on the lagged employment rate in (13)); and employment will contract
along with population, commensurate with the employment elasticity, η.
3 Data
I study decadal census observations between 1960 and 2010 across 722 CZs. Where
possible, I use published county-level aggregates from NHGIS (Manson et al., 2017).
And where necessary, I supplement this with IPUMS census microdata and (for 2010)
pooled American Community Survey (ACS) samples of 2009-11 (Ruggles et al., 2017). I
describe the data more fully in Appendix B, but I summarize the main points here.
The first challenge is to disaggregate log population changes ∆lrt into the contributions
of foreign and internal mobility, λFrt and λIrt. Since I only have discrete-time observations,
I cannot precisely identify these components - though a close approximation is possible.




























where Lrt is the local population of 16-64s at time t; and LFrt is the local foreign-born
population who immigrated in the last ten years (i.e. since t − 1). Motivated by (21), I
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where the final term of (21) is the approximation error. An alternative approach is to






. But (22) and (23)
offer more precision.9 Notice I have constructed λIrt as a residual population change: this
accounts for the entire contribution of natives and “old” migrants (who immigrated before
t − 1) to local population, part of which is driven by “natural” growth and emigration
(especially of the foreign-born). It is not possible to identify emigration in this data; but
I show in Section 6.1 that natives account for the bulk of local crowd-out.
My employment sample also consists of 16-64s. Using the microdata, I adjust all
employment variables for local demographic composition, controlling for age, education,
ethnicity, gender, foreign-born status, and years in the US, together with a rich set of
interactions. In terms of the model, this purges any local variation in the supply shocks
zsrt which is due to observable composition. The aim is to reduce the demands on the
exclusion restrictions. See Appendix B.2 for methodological details.
I identify local demand changes using Bartik (1991) industry shift-shares, and foreign
inflows using the enclave shift-share of Altonji and Card (1991) and Card (2001). I will
describe the exclusion restrictions when I set out the estimating equations. The Bartik
predicts local employment growth, for given initial industrial composition and national-





where φirt−1 is the share of area r individuals working in a 2-digit industry i (57 categories)
in t− 1; and ∆ni(−r)t is i’s national log employment change, excluding area r.10
The enclave shift-share allocates new migrants to areas proportionally to the initial
size of co-patriot communities. This proxies the “foreign intensity” (i.e. inflows in the






















converge to the true λFrt and λIrt as they individually become small,
convergence of (22) and (23) merely requires their product become small. Both these specifications of
λFrt share the advantage of depending on foreign inflows and not on changes in the population of existing
residents (which might otherwise introduce a spurious correlation with λIrt): see Peri and Sparber (2011).
10Autor and Duggan (2003) and Goldsmith-Pinkham, Sorkin and Swift (2020) recommend this exclu-
sion to address possible endogeneity to local supply.
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where φort−1 is the fraction of origin o migrants (77 countries) residing in area r at time
t − 1, and LFo(−r)t is the stock of new origin o migrants (excluding area r residents) who
immigrated between t − 1 and t. I construct both shift-share instruments using census
microdata: see Appendix B.3.
Throughout, I control for a set of observable amenities: (i) presence of coastline11;
(ii) climate, specifically maximum January/July temperatures and mean July relative
humidity; (iii) log population density in 1900; and (iv) an index of CZ isolation (log
distance to closest CZ, measured between population-weighted centroids). To allow for
time-varying effects, I interact each with a full set of year dummies. I do not include
time-varying amenities (like crime), as these may be endogenous to the labor market
(Diamond, 2016). Thus, the estimated effects of local shocks will account for both their
direct (labor market) effect and any indirect effects (via amenity changes).
Table 1 offers descriptive statistics for key variables. Since 1960, the mean foreign
inflow λFrt has grown from 0.02 to 0.06. Unsurprisingly perhaps, the distribution of both
λFrt and the enclave shift-share mrt are very skewed. But I show my results are robust to
omitting outlying observations.
4 Estimates of crowding out and local impact
4.1 Estimating equations and identification
In line with (9), I begin by estimating the conditional crowding out equation:
λIrt = δc0t − δc1λFrt + δc2∆nrt + δc3 (nrt−1 − lrt−1) + ArδcAt + εcrt (26)
where δc1 is the crowding-out effect (which I define in negative terms, for consistency with
the notation in (14)). The (composition-adjusted) employment growth control, ∆nrt,
holds the level of labor demand fixed; so δc1 identifies the mobility response in the absence
of local demand adjustment (i.e. under η = 0). The lagged (composition-adjusted)
employment rate, nrt−1 − lrt−1, summarizes the initial conditions: i.e. any lingering
impact of historical demand or migration shocks. I account for year effects in δc0t, and
the Ar vector contains amenity effects (i.e. observable components of ∆art and art−1 in
(9)), which I interact with year effects (in δcAt). Any unobserved amenity/supply effects
fall into the error, εcrt. Based on (9), this equation should contain no omitted demand
shocks. This is a consequence of the sufficient statistic result: the employment variables
fully summarize local welfare, conditional only on supply effects.
11Coastline data is borrowed from Rappaport and Sachs (2003).
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OLS estimates of (26) are not credible: foreign inflows λFrt, employment growth ∆nrt
and the lagged employment rate are endogenous to omitted amenity/supply effects (both
current and lagged), such as differences in school quality or transport infrastructure.
Three instruments (which exclude these) are required: I use the enclave shift-share mrt
for λFrt, the current Bartik brt for ∆nrt, and the lagged Bartik brt−1 for nrt−1 − lrt−1. In
principle, the initial employment rate will depend on a distributed lag of Bartiks; but in
practice, the first lag offers sufficient power. As with all shift-share instruments, identifi-
cation may be motivated by exogeneity of the initial local migrant/industry shares to the
omitted shocks (Goldsmith-Pinkham, Sorkin and Swift, 2020), or by random aggregate-
level shocks to migrant inflows or industries (Borusyak, Hull and Jaravel, 2018).
At least in this literature, it is unusual to include endogenous variables (suitably
instrumented) as controls. The meaning of such controls is best understood in the context
of a two stage estimator, where the endogenous variables in the second stage are replaced
by their projections on the instruments. Consider the case of the employment control,
∆nrt: the second stage partials out its entire projection on both the Bartik brt and enclave
mrt instruments. Effectively, this allows me to turn off any effect of (enclave-driven)
foreign inflows λFrt which manifests via employment growth, ∆nrt.
Next, I turn to the unconditional estimates of crowding out. Whereas the conditional
specification identifies the counterfactual mobility response in the absence of demand
adjustment (i.e. holding employment growth ∆nrt fixed), the unconditional effect of λFrt
is mediated by the moderating effects of labor demand. I base my empirical specification
on (13):
λIrt = δu0t − δu1λFrt + δu2 brt + δu3 (nrt−1 − lrt−1) + ArδuAt + εurt (27)
Compared to (26), the employment growth control ∆nrt has been replaced with its Bartik
instrument brt: the Bartik accounts for observable components of the exogenous labor
demand shifter ∆zdrt in (13). Since brt captures only exogenous components of local
demand growth, δu1 will be mediated by any endogenous demand adjustment to the foreign
inflow. There are now just two endogenous variables (λFrt and nrt−1 − lrt−1), so I use two
instruments: the enclave shift-share mrt and the lagged Bartik brt−1. Looking at (13), the
error εurt now contains new unobserved innovations in demand ∆zdrt, as well as unobserved
supply/amenity shocks. Historical demand and migration shocks are summarized by the
initial employment rate. As a result, the threats to identification are much weaker than
in traditional specifications which neglect dynamics.
In traditional specifications, these dynamics pose two particular challenges. First,
foreign inflows are locally very persistent (Jaeger, Ruist and Stuhler, 2018); so a naive
regression of internal population flows on contemporaneous immigration may pick up a
sluggish response to historical foreign inflows. Second, the location of migrant enclaves
(which underly the mrt instrument) depends on past local demand shocks, which are
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themselves highly predictive of current shocks (Amior, 2020). But given the sufficient
statistic result, the initial employment rate (nrt−1 − lrt−1) partials out the entire history
of immigration and labor demand shocks. This offers a theoretical basis for Pischke and
Velling’s (1997) suggestion to control for the initial unemployment rate. And it offers a
tractable structural approach to addressing the concerns of Goldsmith-Pinkham, Sorkin
and Swift (2020) about the endogeneity of initial shares in shift-share instruments. Below,
I probe the effectiveness of this strategy.
4.2 Estimates of conditional and unconditional crowd-out
Table 2 presents first stage estimates for (26) and (27). I weight observations by lagged
local population share and cluster errors by state. Each instrument has large positive
effects on its corresponding endogenous variable, with large Sanderson-Windmeijer (2016)
F-statistics (accounting for multiple endogenous variables) reported in Table 3.
Table 3 sets out OLS and IV estimates of (26) and (27). The first two columns
estimate the conditional crowd-out equation (26): these are identical to Table 7 (columns
1-2) of Amior (2020). The OLS coefficient on λFrt (i.e. the negative of δc1) is -0.88; and
the IV coefficient -0.91, with a standard error of just 0.07. That is, holding changes in
labor demand fixed, each new immigrant to a CZ contemporaneously crowds out almost
one existing resident. The similarity between OLS and IV can be attributed to the
employment control: in principle, there are no omitted demand shocks; so any OLS-IV
disparity must be due to omitted supply shocks alone. I also estimate large responses to
employment growth and the lagged employment rate. To see how the dynamics operate,
consider a 1 log point foreign inflow. Given conditional crowd-out δc1 of 0.91 in IV, the
employment rate contracts by 0.09 (holding employment fixed); and this will generate a
net outflow of 0.05 (= 0.56 × 0.09) in the subsequent decade (where 0.56 is the lagged
employment rate coefficient).
As noted above, the model in (9) predicts equal (and opposite) coefficients on the
foreign inflow λFrt and employment growth ∆nrt (i.e. δc1 = δc2). Intuitively, a given
change in λFrt or ∆nrt (conditional on the other) has identical implications for the local
employment rate (and hence local welfare) and should trigger identical mobility responses.
However, my IV estimate of δc1 significantly exceeds δc2. As I have argued above (and see
also Amior, 2020), one possible explanation is native distaste for immigration (as in
e.g. Card, Dustmann and Preston, 2012). Another is monopsony: Amior and Manning
(2020) argue that firms can exploit immigration by extracting larger rents from native
and migrant labor alike. If so, one might expect immigration to have a more adverse
effect on native wages and employment than in the competitive model outlined above.
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I now turn to unconditional crowd-out, where this paper and Amior (2020) diverge.
The OLS estimate of δu1 in (27) is itself very large: a foreign inflow equal to 1% of the
initial local population is associated with a 0.76% net outflow. One would expect OLS to
be biased towards zero, as omitted demand and amenity effects should draw both foreign
and internal inflows. And indeed, the IV estimate in column 4 is even larger, reaching
1.1 (i.e. exceeding one-for-one crowd-out), with a standard error of just 0.13.
My IV estimate of δu1 is also larger than its conditional counterpart δc1 in column 2, and
significantly so: the differential between them is 0.18, with a standard error of just 0.08.12
This is puzzling: the employment response to immigration should moderate the impact on
welfare and internal mobility (if labor demand slopes down, and the employment elasticity
η is positive); and this should be reflected in a smaller unconditional effect. Based on







−0.25 for each new immigrant (with a standard error of 0.1013), i.e. a perversely negative
effect. Below, I will ascribe this result to undercoverage bias: adjusting for the bias, I
find the true employment response is indeed positive (though small).
In Appendix C, I show the unconditional crowd-out effect δu1 is educationally “bal-
anced”: the college share of both the foreign inflow and net outflow (elicited by the enclave
instrument) resemble the local population. This crowd-out is mostly driven by natives
(Section 6.1); it is similarly large both within and across states (Appendix F.3), and
robust to dropping population weights and excluding large or small CZs (Appendix F.2).
In Appendix D, I show it is entirely driven by reductions of migratory inflows to affected
CZs, rather than increases in outflows. This is consistent with Coen-Pirani (2010), Mon-
ras (2015), Dustmann, Schoenberg and Stuhler (2017) and Amior and Manning (2018),
who find that inflows account for the bulk of local population adjustment.
4.3 Credibility of identification strategy
The enclave shift-share instrument is often criticized because of the endogeneity of the
initial migrant shares (Goldsmith-Pinkham, Sorkin and Swift, 2020). If local demand or
amenity shocks are persistent over time (as in e.g. Amior and Manning, 2018) and if
migrants’ location choices are very responsive to these shocks (e.g. Cadena and Kovak,
2016; Amior, 2020), initial migrant shares will not exclude these shocks: see Borjas,
Freeman and Katz (1997). Furthermore, Jaeger, Ruist and Stuhler (2018) argue that
if local labor markets respond sluggishly to immigration shocks, it may be difficult to
12This standard error accounts for statistical dependence between coefficient estimates across the
conditional and unconditional equations. In practice, I account for this dependence by estimating a
single model which nests both the conditional and unconditional equations: I use a dataset with every
observation duplicated, where every right hand variable (and instrument) is interacted with dummy
indicators for both the conditional and unconditional models. The standard error is relatively small
because the δc1 and δu1 estimators covary positively.
13I compute this using the delta method, using the same nested model described in footnote 12.
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empirically disentangle the effects of current and historical shocks.
Exploiting my model’s structure, I address these concerns by controlling for the lagged
employment rate (suitably instrumented), which partials out the initial conditions (and
therefore the entire history of demand and migration shocks, whether observed or unob-
served). This means I can estimate my model in very general contexts, without restricting
attention to particular historical episodes where credible identification is more straight-
forward. To the extent there are any remaining omitted contemporaneous demand shocks
(i.e. unobserved components of ∆zdrt, which are orthogonal to the lagged employment rate
and current Bartik control), these should bias my crowd-out estimates positively (as these
will simultaneously draw foreign and internal inflows), i.e. towards zero.
Reassuringly, the evidence suggests the initial employment rate control is performing
its function well. To see this, consider first what happens if I control for the lagged
enclave shift-share, mrt−1, following the recommendation of Jaeger, Ruist and Stuhler
(2018). Notice that mrt−1 negatively affects the initial employment rate in the first stage
(column 6 of Table 2); but reassuringly, it has no effect in the second stage (column 5
of Table 3). This is consistent with the employment rate summarizing the full history of
shocks. However, once I drop the employment rate in column 6 (and replace it with its
lagged Bartik instrument), mrt−1 now picks up much of the negative effect (this can be
interpreted as the “reduced form” version of column 4, where the lagged employment rate
is reduced to observable shocks). That is, though internal flows do respond sluggishly,
the initial employment rate accounts successfully for these dynamics. Notice also the λFrt
coefficient in column 6 is now smaller: this likely reflects a positive correlation between
the instrument mrt and omitted historical demand shocks (which the employment rate
partials out in column 5).
Peri (2016) and Goldsmith-Pinkham, Sorkin and Swift (2020) recommend testing
for pre-trends. So in column 7, I replace the dependent variable with its lag, λIrt−1.
Reassuringly, the current foreign inflow λFrt and Bartik brt have no significant effect on
λIrt−1: instead, the impact is fully absorbed by the lagged enclave shift-share and Bartik.
To summarize, this suggests my model can tease apart the effects of current and
historical shocks; and the sufficient statistic control (i.e. initial employment rate) offers a
tractable means to accomplish this. That is, the identification strategy appears to work
well. So why do my estimates appear so different to what has come before? An important
contribution of this paper is to address this question head-on. But so as not to interrupt
the flow of the argument, I leave this discussion to Section 6: I attribute the deviation in
results to empirical specification, a failure to condition on initial conditions and observable
demand/supply shifters, and the inclusion of arguably endogenous controls.
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4.4 Impact on employment rates, wages and housing costs
My result of perfect unconditional crowd-out appears to imply full local adjustment to
immigration. But despite this, I now show that foreign inflows have small adverse ef-
fects on local employment rates (my sufficient statistic for local welfare, up to the local
amenity), consistent with Smith (2012), Edo and Rapoport (2019), Gould (2019) and
Monras (2020). Since total population is unaffected, this mechanically implies that to-
tal employment (as measured in the census) perversely contracts in response to foreign
inflows. This is consistent with my unconditional crowd-out estimate δu1 exceeding con-
ditional crowd-out δc1: see Section 4.2 above.
In Table 4, I re-estimate the unconditional equation (27) using the same instruments,
but replacing the dependent variable with changes in the log (composition-adjusted) em-
ployment rate. In column 1, the elasticity of the native employment rate to foreign inflows
is -0.21. The coefficient of -0.41 on the lagged rate suggests the effect is largely dissipated
within two decades. In Appendix C, I show these effects fall largely on non-graduates,
despite educational balance in the foreign inflows and net population outflows.14
Again, my specification successfully disentangles the impact of current and historical
shocks. As in Table 3, the lagged enclave shift-share mrt−1 in column 2 makes little
difference, which suggests the lagged employment rate is indeed controlling for initial
conditions. But once I drop the employment rate in column 3, mrt−1 now takes a positive
effect (reflecting the recovery following the initial shock); and as before, the λFrt coefficient
becomes more negative (which likely reflects omitted demand shocks, correlated with the
enclave instrument). Column 4 replaces the dependent variable with its lag: reassuringly,
as in Table 3, mrt−1 picks up the entire (negative) effect on the lagged dependent, and
the current inflow λFrt becomes insignificant.
Column 5 estimates my preferred specification (column 1) for the migrant employment
rate. The effect is similar to natives, which suggests there may be no great loss (in this
context) from treating natives and migrants as perfect substitutes at the aggregate level.
In principle, lower employment rates should be reflected in lower real consumption
wages, given the labor supply relationship in (2). As I explain above, local wage deflators
are notoriously difficult to construct (and rely on strong theoretical assumptions); and
hence my preference for employment rates. But I can at least estimate the effects on
nominal wages and housing costs separately. I use mean residualized wages, housing rents
and prices, purged of observable demographic and housing characteristics respectively
(see Appendix B.4). While I find no impact on nominal wages, this may be difficult
14This may be a consequence of more severe undercoverage among low-educated migrants (which
understates the labor market pressure on low-educated natives): see Section 5.1.
19
to interpret in the context of declining employment rates, if it is the lowest paid who
leave employment (Card, 2001; Bratsberg and Raaum, 2012). Housing costs do increase
however (see also Saiz, 2007), though the standard errors are too large to deliver statistical
significance. Taking together, there is weak evidence here of a small decline in real wages.
5 Accounting for undercoverage
5.1 Motivation
My finding of perfect crowd-out is puzzling, even in the context of my own results. First,
theory suggests the unconditional effect, δu1 , should be smaller than the conditional,
δc1; but I find the reverse. Second, perfect crowd-out is indicative of full labor market
adjustment, but this is inconsistent with the adverse employment rate effects.
Undercoverage of migrants in the census can help resolve this puzzle. Though the
Census Bureau does itself produce estimates of the general undercount (disaggregated
by race, though not by migrant status), these adjustments are not applied to census
outputs or microdata weights (Clark and Moul, 2003). Among migrants, coverage is
especially patchy for the undocumented (Bean et al., 2001). Surprisingly perhaps, many
undocumented migrants do respond to the census (Warren and Passel, 1987), but a
significant fraction do not.
The basic idea is the following: if foreign inflows are systematically underestimated,
the measured impact of foreign inflows (in the unconditional crowd-out equation) will be
upward biased. As an aside, note that undercoverage may also distort structural estimates
of immigration effects: to the extent that undercounted migrants are low educated15,
the census will overstate the skill composition of migrants, an important input in most
structural models (e.g. Borjas, 2003; Card, 2009; Ottaviano and Peri, 2012).
I begin this section by reviewing existing evidence on the extent of undercoverage. I
then offer a simple model of undercoverage: this shows that controlling for employment
growth (as in the conditional crowd-out equation) should mostly eliminate the bias. In
Section 5.4, I offer supporting evidence for this claim, based on heterogeneity in crowd-out
estimates over time. In Section 5.5, I show how I can identify the size of bias using the
census data alone, exploiting direct estimates of the elasticity η of employment to local
population. And I conclude in Section 5.6 by quantifying the contributions of mobility
and employment to local adjustment, for different levels of undercoverage bias.
15For example, Borjas (2017) finds that undocumented migrants have half the college share of legal
migrants; and undercoverage is understood to be more severe for the undocumented (Bean et al., 2001).
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5.2 Existing evidence on undercoverage
Quantifying the extent of undercoverage is of course challenging. But the existing evi-
dence suggests it is potentially very severe, at least in earlier census years. By comparing
native and Mexican-born death rates, Borjas, Freeman and Lang (1991) conclude that
25% of Mexicans overall were missing from the 1980 census.16 Based on their numbers,
the undercount for Mexicans aged 16-64 is somewhat higher: about 32%.17 But since I
wish to estimate the effect of foreign inflows, what matters for my analysis is undercover-
age among specifically new migrants (with up to 10 years in the US). If we are willing to
assume that all uncounted Mexicans in 1980 arrived after 1970 (this is certainly true of
the vast majority: see Borjas, Freeman and Lang, 1991), we can conclude that more than
half of new Mexican migrants aged 16-64 may have been missing.18 It is also worth em-
phasizing that uncounted Mexicans are disproportionately men (Bean, King and Passel,
1983; Van Hook and Bean, 1998b): this means they will have supplied more labor (and
potentially generated more labor market competition and crowd-out) than the average
migrant who did appear in the census.
Though undercoverage of new migrant inflows was potentially very severe in 1980, the
Census Bureau has actively sought to reduce this problem over time (Clark and Moul,
2003). Consider, for example, the undercoverage rate among undocumented Mexicans (a
particular focus of the literature): while Borjas, Freeman and Lang (1991) place this at
40% in 1980, Van Hook and Bean (1998b) find it shrank to 30% in 1990 (under comparable
assumptions); and based on an external Los Angeles survey, Marcelli and Ong (2002)
find an undercount of 10-15% in 2000 (Card and Lewis, 2007). At the same time, the
amnesty of 1986 (under the Immigration Reform and Control Act) will have greatly
improved coverage in 1990: Van Hook and Bean (1998a) estimate the undocumented
share of Mexican population fell from 51% in 1980 to just 31% in 1990; but this share
rebounded swiftly in the 1990s due to large undocumented immigration.
5.3 Model of undercoverage bias
I now extend my model to account for undercoverage. As in Section 2.6, I will abstract
from the initial employment rate and supply/amenity controls in the crowd-out equations
16Others have arrived at similar numbers, based on specialized surveys of local populations or analysis
of the Mexican census (Van Hook and Bean, 1998b). Among migrants, Mexicans are disproportionately
likely to be undocumented. But what matters for my application is the undercount bias elicited by
the enclave shift-share (rather than the national average); and foreign inflows to CZs with the largest
enclaves (in California and Texas) are dominated by Mexicans.
17Based on their Table 2.2, there are 1.69m Mexicans aged 16-64 who appeared in the 1980 census,
and 781,000 who were missing from the census. This implies an undercoverage rate of 7811690+781 = 32%.
18Among Mexican-born individuals aged 16-64 in the 1980 census microdata, 55% arrived in the last
ten years. This group therefore numbers 55% × 1.69m = 930, 000 (see footnote 17). So if there are
781,000 missing from the census (see footnote 17), the undercoverage rate among new Mexican migrants
(with up to ten years in the US) aged 16-64 is 930930+781 = 54%.
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(one may interpret all variables in the analysis as residuals, conditional on these controls):
this restricts attention to the contemporaneous response to immigration shocks, which
accounts for the bulk of local adjustment. Consider first the simplified unconditional
crowd-out equation in (16). Suppose I do not observe the true foreign inflow λF , but
rather λ̂Frt = (1− π)λFrt, where π ∈ [0, 1] is the fraction of new migrants (arriving since
t− 1) who are missing in the census. And suppose I estimate the model with λ̂Frt on the
right hand side:
λIrt = −δ̂u1 λ̂Frt + δ̂u2 ∆zdrt (28)
The biased crowd-out estimate δ̂u1 will exceed the true effect δu1 by fraction π:
δ̂u1 − δu1 = πδ̂u1 (29)
Now consider the simplified conditional equation in (14). As before, I only observe
λ̂Frt = (1− π)λFrt. But crucially, my data will also understate employment growth, ∆nrt.
In line with the model (and as Table 4 suggests), suppose natives and migrants face iden-
tical changes in (composition-adjusted) employment rates. Then, observed employment
growth will be: ∆n̂rt = ∆ (nrt − lrt) + λIrt + λ̂Frt = ∆nrt − πλFrt. Now, suppose I estimate
the conditional equation using the observed (but mismeasured) λ̂Frt and ∆n̂rt:
λIrt = −δ̂c1λ̂Frt + δ̂c2∆n̂rt (30)
As I show in Appendix E.1, the bias in the estimators δ̂c1 and δ̂c2 can be written as:





δ̂c2 − δc2 = 0 (32)
The coefficient δ̂c2 on measured employment ∆n̂rt in (30) is unbiased: intuitively, the
bias in measured foreign inflows λ̂Frt partials out the bias in employment growth ∆n̂rt.
Under the baseline assumption that δc1 = δc2 (i.e. in the absence of disamenity effects: see
Section 2.4), it must then be that δ̂c1 = δ̂c2; so given (31), the conditional crowd-out effect
δ̂c1 will also be unbiased - for similar reasons. In practice, column 2 of Table 3 (i.e. the
IV estimates) rejects the claim that δ̂c1 = δ̂c2, but the discrepancy is small. My estimates













π = 0.913−0.7430.913 π = 0.19π. That is, conditioning on employment
growth eliminates the bulk of the bias in the crowd-out equation.
5.4 Testing the undercoverage model: Crowd-out by decade
Given the large improvements in coverage documented above, the bias π should be signif-
icantly lower in more recent decades. Based on my model, one should then expect a large
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decline in estimated unconditional crowd-out δ̂u1 ; but only a small decline in conditional
crowd-out δ̂c1, where the employment control partials out most of the bias.
To test this claim, I estimate heterogeneity by decade in conditional and uncondi-
tional crowd-out. I present my results in Table 5, restricting attention to the coefficient
on foreign inflow. Columns 1 and 4 are identical to the basic IV specifications of Table
3 (columns 2 and 4). In columns 2 and 5, I include interactions between the foreign in-
flow and decade effects (my additional instruments are interactions between the enclave
shift-share mrt and the same decade effects), with the 1960s interaction omitted. Col-
umn 2 reveals no clear time trend in conditional crowd-out; but unconditional crowd-out
becomes visibly smaller from the 1980s. Note the 1980s inflows are measured in the 1990
census, following the amnesty and (temporary) steep decline in the undocumented share
of migrants.
Having said that, the standard errors are too large to identify significant differences
between the 1960s and any given decade. In columns 3 and 6, I include a single interaction
between the foreign inflow and a dummy for the 1980-2010 period (which I also interact
with the enclave instrument); and the effects are now statistically significant. Conditional
crowd-out drops from 1.1 pre-1980 to 0.9 post-1980. But as the model predicts, the decline
in unconditional crowd-out is much larger: from 1.8 to 1.0.
5.5 Identification of undercoverage bias π
Table 5 offers indirect evidence of undercoverage bias in my crowd-out estimates. But
using the crowd-out estimates alone (i.e. δ̂u1 , δ̂c1, δ̂c2), it is not possible to identify a value
for π. This is because the difference between conditional and unconditional crowd-out can
be attributed to both undercoverage bias π and the employment elasticity η; and without
further information, it is not possible to disentangle the two. However, it is possible to
identify η by directly estimating the employment response to population (i.e. equation
(11)); and using this information I am able to point identify π.
To show the identification problem formally, replace the true δu1 , δc1 and δc2 in (17) with
the biased estimators (δ̂u1 , δ̂c1, δ̂c2), using equations (29), (31) and (32). Rearranging, this
gives an expression for the bias π in terms of the crowd-out estimators and employment
elasticity η:
π = 1− (1− η) δ̂
c
2






Equation (33) describes a positive relationship between π and η, for given δ̂u1 , δ̂c1 and δ̂c2.
Intuitively, a larger employment elasticity η moderates the true unconditional crowd-out
δu1 (as in equation (17)), so I require more bias π to account for any given estimate of δ̂u1 .
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For illustration, I have plotted the implied relationship between π and η in Figure
1, based on my IV estimates from Table 3: δ̂c1 = 0.913 and δ̂c2 = 0.743 (column 2),
and δ̂u1 = 1.096 (column 4). The shaded area illustrates 95% confidence intervals (with
standard errors computed by the delta method19), for given η. Assuming the employment
elasticity η exceeds 0, the model imposes a lower bound on the undercoverage bias π of 0.2
(with a 0.07 standard error). This lower bound ensures the true unconditional crowd-out
δu1 does not exceed conditional crowd-out δc1, as is necessary for a positive employment
response. And as η goes to 1 (implying employment takes the full burden of adjustment,
so there is no mobility response), π must also go to 1 (to ensure the true unconditional
response is indeed 0).
Based on (33), knowledge of the employment elasticity η (with respect to population)
is sufficient to identify the undercoverage bias π. This elasticity can be estimated directly,
using the employment equation (11). Amior and Manning (2018) estimate η as 0.79, using
January temperature as an instrument for population growth (following Beaudry, Green
and Sand, 2018). In Appendix E.2, I extend Amior and Manning’s analysis by allowing
for distinct employment responses to foreign and (net) internal inflows, using the enclave
shift-share as an additional instrument. Since I am studying crowd-out in response to
immigration, I focus on the elasticity to foreign inflows: this is 0.61.20 As I show in
Appendix E.3, this estimate is itself biased upwards by undercoverage. The form of the
bias is known however, and I derive a “true” employment elasticity η of 0.44. Based on
Figure 1, this would imply an undercoverage bias π of 0.27 (with a standard error of
0.05). This seems reasonable in the context of the evidence described in Section 5.2.
5.6 Quantification of local adjustment mechanisms
For given undercoverage bias π, I can now use equation (18) and my crowd-out estimates
(δ̂u1 , δ̂c1 and δ̂c2) to disentangle the contributions of internal mobility and labor demand to
local adjustment, contemporaneous with a 1-point foreign inflow λFrt. Given uncertainty
over the true value of π, I estimate these contributions in Table 6 for a range of values:
π = 0 (i.e. zero bias), π = 0.197 (the lower bound, commensurate with η = 0: see Figure
1), π = 0.27 (my preferred value, commensurate with η = 0.44), π = 0.4 (a high value),
and π = 1 (the extreme case, for illustration only: zero coverage of new migrants). As
before, standard errors are computed using the delta method: see the table notes.
19Standard errors account for dependence between coefficient estimates across the conditional and
unconditional equations. See footnote 12 for details.
20I estimate employment elasticities of 0.61 to foreign inflows and 0.78 to (net) internal inflows. If
natives and migrants supply identical labor, these should be identical. But since they are identified using
divergent sources of variation (i.e. temperature and enclaves), it is perhaps unwise to over-interpret the
gap between them.
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Rows A and B report estimates of the true δc1 and δu1 , computed as δc1 = (1− π) δ̂c1+πδ̂c2
and δu1 = (1− π) δ̂u1 respectively: see (29) and (31). Recall that δc1 is the counterfactual
mobility response (i.e. with labor demand held fixed, η = 0); whereas δu1 is the actual
response (see equation (18)). For π = 0, the crowd-out effects are of course identical to
those reported in columns 2 and 4 of Table 3. As π increases, the true effects decrease.
Intuitively, to the extent I am underestimating the foreign inflow, the crowd out estimates
will be upward biased. As I have discussed above, controlling for employment in the
conditional equation removes the bulk of the bias: δc1 is much less sensitive to π than δu1 .
As π goes to 1, δu1 goes to zero; whereas δc1 is bounded below at 0.74 (i.e. the δ̂c2 estimate).
For π = 0, δu1 is perversely larger than the counterfactual mobility response δc1 (and
significantly so): see row C. This is reflected in the perversely negative employment re-






, in line with (18)). But
this effect is flipped for π above 0.2, at which point δc1 exceeds δu1 : thereafter, the em-
ployment response in row D turns positive, and converges to 1 with π. Intuitively, the
differential between δc1 and δu1 may be attributed to either the employment elasticity η or
undercoverage bias π; so as π increases, this must be offset by a more positive η.
Row E describes total local adjustment, contemporaneous with a 1-point foreign in-
flow. This is the sum of the mobility response (i.e. unconditional crowd-out δu1 , from






, from Panel D). Overall, the positive
slope in the employment response (with respect to π) dominates the negative slope in the
mobility response; so total adjustment is increasing in π. Still, the effect of π is small:
total adjustment is close to 0.9, for any value of π.
Row F describes the overall impact of foreign inflows on the employment rate. This is
simply total adjustment minus 1: see equation (18). Since total adjustment is increasing
in π, the employment rate effect is decreasing in magnitude. For my preferred π of 0.27,
I predict a -0.11 effect (based on my crowd-out estimates), with a standard error of 0.04.
This predicted effect can be compared to my direct estimates of the employment rate
effect in Table 4 (column 1): this offers a testable overidentifying restriction. Taking my
IV estimate of -0.21 (for natives), and multiplying this by (1− π) = 0.73 to correct for
undercoverage bias, I have 0.15, which falls well within the confidence interval of Panel
F (at π = 0.27). This offers further support for the model’s fit.
Finally, Panel G reports the mobility response (Panel B) as a share of total adjustment
(Panel E). At π = 0.2, population mobility accounts for 100% of the contemporaneous
adjustment to foreign inflows; and this converges to zero as π goes to 1. But for reasonable
values of π, the population share of adjustment is consistently high. For example, at my
preferred π of 0.27, mobility accounts for 90% (with a standard error of 9%). One may
be surprised the contribution of employment (i.e. 10%) is so small, despite the large
25
employment elasticity η (equal to 0.44 for π = 0.27). But as the algebra in (17) shows,
the employment response may have little traction if population itself is very elastic. And
indeed, the evidence shows the same is true of local adjustment to labor demand shocks:
here also, the burden of adjustment falls mostly on population rather than employment
(Blanchard and Katz, 1992; Hornbeck, 2012; Amior and Manning, 2018).
6 Robustness of unconditional crowd-out
Above, I have argued that population mobility accounts for the bulk of local adjustment
to immigration shocks, consistent with the evidence on adjustment to labor demand
shocks. In the presence of undercoverage, my estimates of the mobility response are
upward biased. But for plausible levels of bias, mobility continues to play the dominant
role. Ultimately, this is a consequence of my large unconditional crowd-out estimates.
But why should my crowd-out estimates differ from much of the existing literature?
After all, Section 4.3 suggests my identification strategy works well. In this section, I
attempt to address this question. I begin in Section 6.1 by studying the sensitivity of my
δu1 estimates to various sample and specification choices found in other studies, relying
on aggregate-level cross-CZ variation (as I have done until now). However, much of the
literature exploits variation across skill groups within areas: I address this approach in
Sections 6.2-6.4. In Appendix G and H, I attempt to reconcile my findings with one well-
known aggregate-level study (Card, 2007) and a classic within-area study (Card, 2001). I
conclude that empirical specification and choice of controls can help account for apparent
discrepancies between my estimates and the broader literature.
6.1 Robustness of aggregate-level estimates
I begin by studying the robustness of my aggregate-level IV estimate of δu1 in Table 3
(column 4). In Section 4.3, I focused on local dynamics and tested for pre-trends. I now
consider the implications of (i) controls and decadal sample, (ii) excluding old migrants,
(iii) a total migrant shock, (iv) outliers, (v) CZ sample and weighting, (vi) cross/within-
state variation, (vii) functional form of key variables, (viii) instrument specification (ix) a
specification in levels, and (x) controlling for time-invariant local trends. I also consider
the possible role of (xi) simultaneity bias in previous estimates. I leave several of these
results to Appendix F and G: in these cases, I provide brief summaries here.
(i) Controls and decadal sample. Table 7 assesses the sensitivity of my IV
δu1 estimate to the choice of controls (as Goldsmith-Pinkham, Sorkin and Swift, 2020,
recommend) and decadal sample. With no controls (except year effects), the estimates
vary greatly by decade (row A): I find little crowd-out in the 1960s and 1980s (consistent
with Butcher and Card, 1991) and much more in other periods (consistent with Filer,
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1992, who studies the 1970s). This discrepancy has previously been noted by Butcher
and Card (1991), Borjas and Freeman (1991) and Wright, Ellis and Reibel (1997); and it
speaks to the concerns of Borjas, Freeman and Katz (1997) about the instability of spatial
correlations. My contribution is to show this instability can be resolved by including
plausibly exogenous controls. The average effect (column 6) increases from -0.53 to -0.75
when I control for the current Bartik and initial employment rate (row C): i.e. even
without the amenity controls, estimated crowd-out is substantial. And after including
the exogenous amenities (especially climate, which is known to be a key determinant
of regional migration: see Rappaport, 2007; Albouy, 2008), I cannot statistically reject
(at least) one-for-one crowd-out in any decade: see row H.21 Intuitively, both natives
and migrants are attracted to places with strong labor market conditions and pleasant
climate (see also Albouy, Cho and Shappo, forthcoming), so omitting these will bias my
δu1 estimate towards zero. Crucially, the extent of the omitted variable bias will depend
on the peculiarities of each individual decade: this can help explain why different papers
(which study different decades) arrive at such different results.
(ii) Excluding old migrants. In row I of Table 7, I replace the dependent variable
λIrt with the native contribution to local population (i.e. excluding “old” migrants, who
immigrated before t−1: see table notes). Compared to row H, column 6 shows two thirds
of the average δu1 is driven by natives rather than old migrants. But this overlooks some
important heterogeneity: exceptionally, in the 2000s, old migrants account for the entire
effect. One possible explanation is large return migration to Mexico in the 2000s (see
Hanson, Liu and McIntosh, 2017), driven in part by the construction bust and recession.
(iii) Total migrant shock. Though I summarize immigration shocks in terms of
new foreign inflows (in line with my model), much of the literature studies the total
change in the migrant stock (i.e. all foreign-born individuals). In the final row of Table
7, I replicate the exercise of row I (i.e. studying the native response, with the full set of
controls) but replace the foreign inflow λFrt with the total migrant contribution to local
population growth (see table notes). This makes little difference to the results. Since I
have now returned old migrants to the model (this time in the regressor), the average
effect in column 6 is almost identical to my original specification (-1.1). And I continue
to find large negative effects in almost all decades. The one outlier is of course the 2000s,
where each new migrant crowds out one previous migrant (see row I); and therefore,
exceptionally, the enclave shift-share instrument has no power in this decade.22
21Crowd-out in row H is especially large before 1980, consistent with my findings in Table 5: I attribute
this to larger undercoverage bias.
22In the first stage regression for the total migrant contribution, the coefficient on the enclave shift-
share mrt in the 2000s is just 0.16 (with a standard error of 0.12).
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(iv) Outliers (Appendix F.1). In Appendix Figure A1, I plot my δu1 estimates
graphically, conditional on the covariates. The effects are visibly not driven by outliers.
(v) CZ sample and weighting (Appendix F.2). In Appendix Table A5, I show
the crowding out effect is robust to different CZ samples and weighting choices. Much
of the literature focuses on MSAs (to the exclusion of small towns and rural areas); but
restricting my sample to the largest 100 CZs does not affect the results. Butcher and
Card (1991) and Wright, Ellis and Reibel (1997) find some evidence of larger crowd-out
in the top five migrant destinations (Los Angeles, New York, Chicago, Miami and San
Francisco), but excluding these also makes little difference. Given the skew in the spatial
distribution of foreign inflows (Table 1), one may be concerned the estimates are driven
by CZs with unusually large inflows. But, excluding observations with enclave shift-share
mrt above 0.1 (the maximum is 0.29) changes little: this is consistent with the patterns
in Appendix Figure A1. Finally, my main estimates are weighted by local population
share, which ensures they are largely driven by variation across larger CZs; but removing
these weights makes little difference.
(vi) Cross/within-state variation (Appendix F.3). Famously, Borjas (2006)
finds less crowd-out across states than metro areas. But in Appendix Table A5, I cannot
reject one-for-one crowd-out using state-level data (δu1 is 0.94). At the same time, con-
trolling for state fixed effects in my CZ data makes little difference to my results. This
suggests the CZ-level crowd-out is equally driven by variation across and within states.
(vii) Functional form (Appendix F.4). My specification of λIrt and λFrt is almost
identical to Card and DiNardo (2000) and Card (2001), as recommended by Peri and



















, in line with my model. Appendix Table A6
shows this alternative specification makes little difference to my δu1 estimate.
(viii) Instrument specification (Appendix F.5). In my main estimates, I base
the enclave shift-share in (25) on one-decade-lagged origin shares. But as I show in
Appendix Table A6, applying 1960 origin shares to all decades (following the example of
Hunt, 2017) makes little difference to the results.
(ix) Specification in levels (Appendix F.6). In line with my model (and also
Card, 2001; Peri and Sparber, 2011), I have specified the key variables (i.e. foreign inflows
and net internal outflows) relative to the existing population. But as I show in Appendix




on LFrt, without normalizing by initial population. As Wright, Ellis and Reibel (1997)
note, local population may be an important omitted variable in this specification; but
like Wozniak and Murray (2012), I address this by controlling for local fixed effects.23
23This levels specification can also address possible concerns that my main estimates are conflated
with spurious correlation in local population, which appears in the denominator of both the dependent
variable and regressor of interest (see Clemens and Hunt, 2019).
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(x) Time-invariant local trends (Appendix F.7). As I show in Appendix Table
A6, I also cannot reject perfect crowd-out when I control for CZ fixed effects in my main
specification. This approach is similar to the double differencing methodology of Borjas,
Freeman and Katz (1997) and is recommended by Hong and McLaren (2015). The idea is
to pick up time-invariant local trends in omitted supply or demand. This is a demanding
specification for my short panel, given large persistence in the enclave shift-share; and
as Aydemir and Borjas (2011) note, measurement error may be a greater challenge in
the presence of fixed effects. But precision does improve substantially when I replace the
lagged employment rate control with lagged Bartik and enclave shift-shares.
(xi) Simultaneity bias (Appendix G). Table 7 demonstrates the importance of
partialing out observable local conditions, whether related to labor demand or amenities.
However, I have been careful to restrict attention to plausibly exogenous controls; and I
have relied on instruments to deal with any remaining omitted effects. Understandably
though, older studies (such as the seminal work of Wright, Ellis and Reibel, 1997) are more
susceptible to endogeneity concerns.24 A more subtle question is whether to control for
lagged population, as in Card (2007). Wright, Ellis and Reibel argue that local population
may be an important omitted variable: this is certainly true in their specification, which
expresses native and migrant population changes in absolute terms (see part ix above).
But it is not clear why it should apply to a specification like mine or Card (2007),
which studies population flows relative to initial population (as recommended by Peri
and Sparber, 2011). Indeed, in the presence of omitted demand or amenity shocks,
there is reason to believe a lagged population control will generate a spurious negative
correlation with the dependent variable λIrt = log
Lrt−LFrt
Lrt−1
(where lagged population Lrt−1
appears in the denominator). As it happens, controlling for lagged population makes no
difference to my crowd-out estimate, conditional on my demand or amenity controls. But
in the absence of these controls, it does have an important effect. I show in Appendix G
that this observation can help reconcile my results with Card (2007).
6.2 Within-area crowd-out: Empirical specification
Above, I study crowd-out at the aggregate CZ-level, in line with the “total effects” ap-
proach recommended by Dustmann, Schoenberg and Stuhler (2016). But much of the lit-
erature exploits variation in immigration across skill groups within areas. In this section,
I show theoretically (and demonstrate empirically) that aggregate-level and within-area
specifications identify different objects: this offers a means to reconcile differing results.
24Wright, Ellis and Reibel (1997) does not instrument for foreign inflows, and rely instead on a timing
argument (lagging foreign inflows by 5 years). But this approach cannot be credible if shocks to local
demand are heavily persistent, as the evidence suggests (e.g. Blanchard and Katz, 1992; Amior and
Manning, 2018). Wright, Ellis and Reibel (1997) and White and Imai (1994) also include arguably
endogenous controls on the right-hand side, such as local unemployment, wages, and house prices: to
the extent these are correlated with foreign inflows, they are likely to bias the crowd-out effect.
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Consider a within-area (superscript w) specification for unconditional crowd-out:
λIjrt = δw0 − δw1 λFjrt + drt + djt + εjrt (34)
where λFjrt and λIjrt are the foreign and residual contributions to local population growth
among skill group j. These are constructed identically to (22) and (23), but using the skill
j sample. The drt in (34) are area-time interacted fixed effects, which absorb local shocks
common to all groups; and djt are skill-time interacted effects, which absorb group-specific
national trends.
The coefficient of interest, δw1 , identifies the impact of skill-specific foreign inflows
λFjrt on (the contribution of existing US residents to) local skill composition. Existing
estimates of the λFjrt effect are typically small and sometimes negative (Card and DiNardo,
2000; Card, 2001, 2005; Cortes, 2008), though Borjas (2006) and Monras (2020) offer
alternative views.25 Either way, a small δw1 is not necessarily inconsistent with large
spatial crowd-out - for two reasons. First, changes in local skill composition reflect not
only differential internal mobility, but also changes in the characteristics of local birth
cohorts. And second, as Card (2001) and Dustmann, Schoenberg and Stuhler (2016)
note, δw1 does not account for the economic impact that new immigrants exert outside
their own skill group j.
Regarding the latter point, consider a simple example. Suppose area r production of














where Zdr is an aggregate area r demand shifter, εd ≥ 0 is the aggregate-level elasticity of
labor demand (which allows for locally diminishing returns), and σ ≥ 0 is the elasticity
of substitution between skill groups (within areas r). In Appendix A.4, I integrate the
implied labor demand relationship into a model of local adjustment (akin to Section 2),
with an internal population elasticity of γ and elasticity of labor supply εs common to all















σ + εs (37)
25Borjas’ (2006) methodology however is disputed by Peri and Sparber (2011) and Card and Peri
(2016). Monras (2020) estimates a large negative δw1 following a sudden surge of Mexican immigration,
but the effect is small over decadal census intervals.
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The form of (36) is identical to aggregate-level crowd-out δu1 (compare the λFrt coefficient in
(13)), with the exception that the aggregate-level elasticity of employment to population,
i.e. η, is now replaced by a within-area equivalent, ηw.
Comparing (12) to (37), η and ηw (and therefore δu1 and δw1 ) are only equal under very
special conditions: specifically if (i) σ = εd (i.e. the elasticity of substitution is equal to
the aggregate-level elasticity of labor demand) and (ii) κ → ∞ (i.e. housing is supplied
perfectly elasticity). Intuitively, both these conditions eliminate the impact of foreign
inflows to one group (in some area r) on other groups: σ = εd ensures the technology in
(35) is additively separable, so there is no labor market interaction between skill groups;
and κ→∞ ensures local prices are fixed, so there is no housing market interaction. Any
such interactions will ensure the impact of foreign inflows is diffused across multiple skill
groups - and therefore (to some extent) partialed out by the local fixed effects, drt. Note
that removing these fixed effects will not solve the problem: the estimated δw1 would then
be an awkward mixture between the cross-area and within-area effects (i.e. some function
of both η and ηw), which will be even harder to interpret.
One important implication is that the δw1 estimate will be sensitive to exactly how
the skill groups are defined. In practice, we do not know the “true” skill delineation: this
is ultimately a choice the researcher makes. But a finer delineation of skill groups will
artificially engender a larger elasticity of substitution σ; and as (36) and (37) show, this
will ensure a larger within-area employment elasticity ηw and a smaller crowd-out effect
δw1 . In the extreme case, as σ becomes very large, the within-area crowd-out effect δw1
will go to zero - entirely independently of the aggregate-level effect δu1 .
To summarize, δw1 will not in general identify aggregate-level crowd-out δu1 for two
reasons. First, there may be important local birth cohort effects. And second, even in the
absence of cohort effects, the impact of a skill-specific foreign inflow will be diffused across
the local economy (through both labor and housing market interactions) and therefore
not be fully captured by within-area estimates.
6.3 Estimates of within-area crowd-out δw1
I now demonstrate empirically that both local economic interactions and local cohort
effects make an important contribution to the within-area estimate δw1 . I present my
estimates in Table 8. Of course, these will be sensitive to any skill-biased undercoverage
of migrants - so the actual numbers should be treated with some caution.
To explore the role of local economic interactions, I study four different education-
based26 “skill” delineations (which will likely engender different σ elasticities): (i) college
26A potential drawback of education groupings is occupational downgrading of migrants. Card (2001)
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graduates / non-graduates; (ii) at least one year of college / no college (as in Monras,
2020); (iii) high school dropouts / all others (Card, 2005; Cortes, 2008); (iv) four groups:
dropouts, high school graduates, some college and college graduates (Borjas, 2006).
To explore the role of cohort effects, I compare estimates for (i) pooled census cross-
sections (used by most of the literature) and (ii) a longitudinal dimension of the census
which isolates the mobility response (used by Card, 2001; Borjas, 2006): respondents
were asked where they lived five years ago. This question appears in the 1980, 1990 and
2000 census, yielding information on migratory flows over 1975-1980, 1985-1990 and 1995-
2000.27 For comparability, I restrict the pooled cross-section sample to the same three
decades: the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. Unlike the five-year intervals of my longitudinal
data however, the pooled cross-sections consist of decadal (census) intervals.
To exclude education-specific local demand shocks (the θjrt in (35)), I instrument
foreign inflows λFjrt in (34) using an education-specific enclave shift-share mjrt, following
Card (2001). This is identical to (25) above, but is constructed using the skill j sample
alone. As is clear from columns 1 and 4 of Table 8, mjrt is a strong instrument.
In the pooled cross-section data, the effect of foreign inflows is remarkably large and
positive (so δw1 in (34) is negative), ranging from 1 to 1.5 for the total residual contribution
in column 2 (accounting for both natives and old migrants). That is, each new immigrant
in a given CZ-education cell attracts an additional 1-1.5 workers to the same cell (relative
to other cells). A comparison with column 3 reveals that these positive effects are (more
than) entirely driven by natives.
In contrast, the longitudinal estimates in column 5 (which exclude cohort effects) are
consistently negative. They also vary considerably in magnitude, from -3.6 for the college
graduate/non-graduate delineation (though not significantly different to -1) to just -0.19
for the four-group delineation. In most cases, natives contribute substantially to these
effects (column 6). The model offers a rationale for this variation: finer delineations (such
as the four-group) should engender greater substitutability in production (i.e. larger σ),
greater within-area diffusion of labor market effects, and consequently lower estimates
of δw1 . In particular, if high school dropouts are close substitutes with other non-college
workers (Card, 2009), this can explain the relatively low effect in the third row (-0.43).
Using similar longitudinal data though, Card (2001) estimates a mildly positive effect
of foreign inflows. In Appendix H, I attribute this to his fine delineation of skill groups
(Card uses six imputed occupations, which will admit large productive substitutability
addresses this concern by probabilistically assigning individuals to occupations (based on demographics),
separately for natives and migrants. I offer estimates for these imputed occupations in Appendix H.
27Previous residence is only classified by state in the 1970 microdata, and the ACS (after 2000) only
reports place of residence 12 months previously. Since previous residence is constructed according to
where current respondents previously lived, these flows will not account for emigration from the US. But
to the extent that emigration is a response to an individual’s local economic environment, my estimates
should then understate the extent of crowd-out.
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σ) and his choice of right hand side controls (which I argue may be problematic).28
6.4 Direct evidence of local cohort effects
The difference between the pooled cross-section and longitudinal estimates is suggestive
of large cohort effects. But in Appendix F.8, I offer more direct evidence for this, by
exploiting information on individuals’ state of birth. Using the same estimating equation
(34), I show that foreign inflows to a given state exert a larger impact on the education
composition of natives born in that state (i.e. the pure birth cohort effect) than on those
residing in it (which accounts for both birth cohorts and mobility).
As an example, consider a local inflow of low educated immigrants. Despite a large net
outflow of low educated natives, the native college share will typically contract relative to
elsewhere: the impact of spatial crowd-out on local skill composition is more than offset
by a decline in the education levels of local birth cohorts.
Certainly, one may expect low-skilled immigration to raise the return to education and
stimulate greater skills acquisition (see Hunt, 2017). But the effect can plausibly go the
other way: Llull (2018) argues a fall in wages may discourage labor market attachment
and the accumulation of human capital.
7 Conclusion
Using census data since 1960, I estimate that new immigrants crowd out existing residents
one-for-one (or 1.1 for one, in my preferred estimates) over decadal intervals. This effect
is robust to numerous specification choices; and even in OLS, I find substantial crowd-out
of 0.76. It is also educationally “balanced”: the college share of both foreign inflows and
net outflows resemble the local population. I base my main estimates on CZs, but I find
similar effects across states. And it is entirely driven by reduced internal inflows to the
affected areas, rather than larger outflows. My results appear to conflict with much of
the existing literature, but I show how these estimates can be reconciled.
The magnitude of the effect is puzzling, even in the context of my own results. First,
theory predicts that conditional crowd-out (i.e. holding changes in employment fixed)
should be smaller than unconditional; but I find the opposite. Second, perfect crowd-out
is indicative of full labor market adjustment, but this is inconsistent with the adverse
employment rate effects.
28Card controls for various demographic means within area-skill cells (age, education, migrants’ years
in US at baseline), which absorb much of the migration shock’s variation. In principle, these controls
may be picking up exogenous skill-specific shocks which I have neglected, though it is not clear (ex ante)
what these might be. Furthermore, to the extent that the migration shocks and internal responses are
persistent over time (as the evidence suggests), there is legitimate concern that they are endogenous to
the dependent variable: foreign and internal mobility are liable to shift the demographic characteristics
of the area-skill cells. See Appendix H.
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I argue that census undercoverage of migrants can resolve these puzzles. This view is
consistent with the much larger estimates of unconditional (but importantly, not condi-
tional) crowd-out before 1980, when coverage was poorer. Exploiting my model’s struc-
ture, I attribute 30% of observed crowd-out to mismeasurement. The remaining effect is
largely a consequence of the labor market impact, though I argue disamenity effects and
monopsony may also play a role. Though labor demand (itself mediated by the hous-
ing market) does cushion the impact of immigration, I show that population mobility
accounts for 90% of local labor market adjustment. This result arises from a remark-
ably simple decomposition, which requires no information on wages or prices, and does
not impose any parameter values ex ante. The dominant role of population mobility is
consistent with what we know about local adjustment following labor demand shocks.
These findings have important methodological implications for the estimation of im-
migration effects. First, local variation is often exploited to identify the national impact
of immigration; but the interpretation of such estimates requires some caution, in light of
the near-perfect response from internal mobility. Second, undercoverage will bias upwards
reduced form estimates of immigration effects; and it may also cause us to overstate the
skill composition of migrants, a key input for structural estimates.
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A Derivations of equations in theoretical model
A.1 Conditional crowd-out: Derivation of (9)




|τ=t = eγτλFr (τ) + γeγτ [nr (τ)− zsr (τ) + εsar (τ)] (A1)
Integrating both sides between τ = t− 1 and τ = t:





















[nr (t− 1)− lr (t− 1)] (A3)
and again:
lr (t)− lr (t− 1) =
∫ t
t−1
e−γ(t−τ)λFr (τ) dτ + [nr (t)− nr (t− 1)] (A4)









[nr (t− 1)− lr (t− 1)− zsr (t− 1) + εsar (t− 1)]
Now, assume the foreign inflow λFr (τ) is constant and equal to λFrt within the (t− 1, t]
unit interval. And assume also that employment nr, the supply shifter zsr and the amenity
effect ar change at a constant rate over the interval. This implies:

















[nr (t− 1)− lr (t− 1)− zsr (t− 1) + εsar (t− 1)]
Equation (9) then follows after subtracting the foreign inflow λFrt on both sides.
A.2 Housing market specification: Derivation of (10)
Suppose workers have Cobb-Douglas preferences over the traded good and housing, so
they spend a fixed fraction ν of their income on housing. This implies a simple linear
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expression for the local price index:
prt = νphrt + (1− ν) pt (A6)
For simplicity, suppose there are no income transfers across areas. Then, housing demand






hdrt = log ν + wrt + nrt − phrt (A8)






To ease the exposition, I have assumed in (A9) that housing production does not depend
on local labor; but see the Online Appendices of Amior and Manning (2018) for an
extension where it does. Equating supply and demand, and substituting (A6) for phrt,
gives:
prt − pt =
ν
1− ν + εhs
[
log ν + 1
εs
(nrt − lrt − zsrt) + nrt
]
(A10)
And taking first differences then yields equation (10) in the main text:














is increasing in the elasticity of housing supply, εhsr .
A.3 Unconditional crowd-out: Derivation of (13)
To move from the conditional crowd-out specification (9) to the unconditional specifica-
tion (13), I require a solution for local employment. Using the labor supply and demand











εs + εd∆ (prt − pt) (A13)
Replacing the local price deviation ∆ (prt − pt) with (A11):






and disaggregating local population growth ∆lrt into foreign and internal contributions:
∆nrt = η
(
λFrt + λIrt + ∆zsrt
)













Equation (13) can then be derived by substituting (A15) for ∆nrt in equation (9).
A.4 Within-area crowd-out specification: Derivation of (36)
In this appendix, I set out a multi-skill labor model of local labor market adjustment,
and I derive the expression for the within-area crowd-out estimate, δw1 , in equation (36).
Assuming a competitive labor market, the CES technology in (35) implies the following
skill-specific demand for local labor:
njr = σ log
εd − 1
εd
− σ (wjr − p) + σ
(




εd − 1 yr (A17)
where njr is log local employment of skill j labor, wjr is the skill-specific local wage, p is
the (locally invariant) price of tradables, zdr = logZdr is an aggregate-level local demand
shifter, θjr is a skill-specific local demand shifter, and yr is the log of total local output
Yr.
Parallel with (2) in Section 2, I also write an equation for skill j labor supply:
njr = ljr + εs (wjr − pr) + zsjr (A18)
And parallel with (4), suppose that indirect utility for skill j depends on a skill-specific
amenity ajr and real consumption wage (wjr − pr), which itself can be replaced with the
employment rate using (A18):




njr − ljr − zsjr
)
+ ajr
Notice that local labor market conditions for skill j can be fully summarized by the
skill-specific employment rate (njr − ljr): this is a skill-specific version of the sufficient
statistic result in Section 2.
Skill j subscripts can also be applied to the internal migratory response, equation (7).
For simplicity, suppose the elasticity γ is common to all skill groups. So, the resident





njr − ljr − zsjr + εsajr
)
(A20)
By symmetry with the model in Section 2, these equations can be discretized to yield a














njrt−1 − ljrt−1 − zsjrt−1 + εsajrt−1
)
where λFjrt is the skill-specific foreign inflow. To derive the unconditional crowding out
effect, I require a solution for local skill-specific employment ∆njrt. Given (A18) and the














σ + εs∆yrt (A22)





























) (njrt−1 − ljrt−1 − zsjrt−1 + εsajrt−1)
where
ηw ≡ σ
σ + εs (A24)
is the within-area elasticity of employment with respect to population, analogous to the
aggregate-level η in (A16).
Now consider how this maps onto the within-area empirical specification (34). The
area-time fixed effects drt will absorb the contents of the second line of (A23). The
skill-time fixed effects djt will absorb any (national-level) skill-time varying components
of: (i) the skill-specific demand shock ∆ log θjrt, (ii) the skill-specific supply shock ∆zsjrt,
(iii) the skill-specific amenity shock ∆ajrt, and (iv) the initial conditions on the final line
of (A23). All remaining variation will fall into the error term εjrt, so the IV exclusion
restriction requires that it is uncorrelated with the skill-specific enclave shift-share, mjrt.














which is equation (36).
B Data construction
B.1 Population
The data processing builds on the earlier work of Amior and Manning (2018). Local
population counts for 16-64s are based on published county-level statistics, taken from
the National Historical Geographic Information System (NHGIS: Manson et al., 2017).
The precise tables references are given in the Online Appendices of Amior and Manning
(2018). I group counties together to form Commuting Zones (CZs), following the scheme
of Tolbert and Sizer (1996).29
I disaggregate these local population stocks into demographic components: “new” mi-
grants (in the US for 10 years or less), “old” migrants, natives, and education-by-nativity
groups. To this end, I rely on local population shares computed from the Integrated
Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS: Ruggles et al., 2017) microdata samples. For the
2010 cross-section, I use the American Community Surveys (ACS) of 2009, 2010 and 2011
(pooled together); I use the 5% census extracts for 2000, 1990, 1980 and 1960; and the
(pooled) forms 1 and 2 metro 1% extracts of 1970. The main difficulty here is that the
sub-state geographical identifiers in the IPUMS microdata do not precisely identify CZs,
and these identifiers also vary across years. Following Autor and Dorn (2013) and Autor,
Dorn and Hanson (2013), I impute CZ-level data by weighting estimates with population
counts at the intersection of CZs and these identifiers. The sources for these intersection
population counts can be found in the Online Appendices of Amior and Manning (2018).
B.2 Employment
Unlike Amior and Manning (2018), but similarly to Amior (2020), local employment
stocks (for 16-64s) are adjusted for demographic composition. The first step is to run
individual-level probit regressions of a binary employment variable on detailed demo-
graphic characteristics (listed below) and local fixed effects, separately for each micro-
data census cross-section (for 1960-2000) and the pooled ACS sample (of 2009-11). The
local fixed effects correspond to the finest available geographical units available in each
29I make one minor modification to this scheme, to facilitate consistent definitions over time: I include
La Paz County (AZ) in the same CZ as Yuma County (AZ).
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cross-section; but where geographical units are subsumed within the same CZ, I aggregate
them together (to reduce computational demands).
Separately for each cross-section, I then compute the mean predicted employment
rate in each geographical unit, for a distribution of demographic characteristics identical








g (Xit) di (A26)
where Ω is the normal c.d.f., θ̂rt are the local fixed effects, θ̂t is the vector of coefficients
on the individual characteristics Xit, and g (Xit) is the density of individuals with these
characteristics. I aggregate to CZ-level by taking averages across the available geograph-
ical units, weighting by population counts at the intersections (as described in Section
B.1).
In the empirical application, I identify nrt−lrt with the log of the composition-adjusted
employment rate, EmpRateAdjrt. And I identify the log employment level nrt with the
sum of the log adjusted employment rate and log population: logEmpRateAdjrt + lrt.
In the probit regressions, I control for the following characteristics: age, age squared,
four education indicators30 (each interacted with age and age squared), a gender dummy
(interacted with all previously-mentioned variables), black/Asian/Hispanic indicators (in-
teracted with all previously-mentioned variables), and a foreign-born indicator (also in-
teracted with all previously-mentioned variables). In each cross-section, I also control for
years in the US (among the foreign-born), again interacted with all previously mentioned
variables. Information on years in the US is not consistently reported in each year, so I
use different variables in each year:
ACS 2009-11: Years in US, years in US squared.
Census 2000: Years in US, years in US squared.
Census 1990: The census only reports years in US as a categorical variable. I
take the mid-point of each category (and its square), and I also include a dummy for
top-category cases.
Census 1980: Same as 1990. Except those who were citizens at birth do not report
years in US: I code all these cases with a dummy variable.
Census 1970: Same as 1980. Except some respondents do not report years in US:
I code all these non-response cases with a dummy variable. I also include an additional
binary indicator for migrants who report living abroad five years previously (based on a
different census question), which is available for the full sample. (I exclude foreign-born
respondents in the form 2 sample, as they do not report years in US.)
30High school graduate (12 years of education), some college education (1 to 3 years of college),
undergraduate degree (4 years of college) and postgraduate degree (more than 4 years of college). High
school dropouts (less than 12 years of education) are the omitted category.
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Census 1960: No information on years in US is available.
B.3 Shift-share instruments
In this section, I offer further details on the data underlying the Bartik industry and
enclave shift-shares. The Bartik shift-share brt is based on a panel of CZ-by-industry
employment. My sample for this exercise consists of employed individuals aged 16-64. For
industries, I use the IPUMS consistent classification (based on the 1950 census scheme),
aggregated to the 2-digit level31 (with 57 codes). For each cross-section, I collapse the
data to industry and the finest available sub-state geographical unit; and I then aggregate
to CZ-level using the population weights described in Section B.1.
In turn, I construct the enclave shift-share mrt using a panel of migrant population
counts by CZ and 77 countries of origin. Again, I aggregate from the various sub-state
geographical identifiers to CZ-level, using appropriate population weights. An important
component of mrt is the stock of new migrants (by origin o) who arrived in the US in the
previous ten years (outside area r): i.e. LFo(−r)t in equation (25). This can be constructed
directly in all cross-sections from 1970 inclusive (which covers foreign inflows from the
1960s), since these cross-sections report year of arrival. But, for columns 5-8 of Table 3
(which condition on the lagged enclave shift-share), I also need to construct mrt for 1960
(i.e. covering the 1950s inflow). My strategy is to impute the 1950s inflows using cohort
changes: this is the difference between (i) the stock of origin o migrants in 1960 aged
16-64 (outside area r) and (ii) the stock of origin o migrants in 1950 aged 6-54 (again,
outside r).
B.4 Wages and housing costs
In Section 4.4, I study the impact of immigration on local residualized wages, housing
rents and housing prices, all of which I adjust for local (demographic or housing) compo-
sition.
I compute hourly wages as the ratio of annual labor earnings to the product of weeks
worked and usual hours per week, in the census and ACS microdata. I restrict my wage
sample to employees aged 16-64, excluding those in group quarters; and I also exclude
wage observations below the 1st and above the 99th percentiles within each geographical
unit in the microdata. For each census cross-section, I then regress log hourly wages
on a rich set of demographic controls32, and I compute the mean residual within each
31See https://usa.ipums.org/usa/volii/occ_ind.shtml. To address inconsistencies between census years,
I group all wholesale sectors in a single category, and similarly for public administration and fi-
nance/insurance/real estate. I also drop individuals coded to “Not specified manufacturing industries”.
32These are the same controls I use for adjusting local employment rates: age, age squared, five
education indicators, black/Asian/Hispanic indicators, gender, foreign-born status, and where available,
years in US and its square for migrants, together with a rich set of interactions.
48
geographical unit (for the nativity group of interest). I then impute CZ-level wages by
taking weighted averages across these units.
My housing sample consists of houses and apartments: I exclude farms, units with
over 10 acres of land, and units with commercial use. To construct the rental index,
I regress the monthly rents of privately rented units on a rich set of housing charac-
teristics33 (restricting attention to prices between the 1st and 99th percentiles, within
each geographical unit), separately for each census cross-section. And I compute the
local mean of the residuals within each geographical unit. I residualize local housing
prices in the same way, though the sample is now restricted to owner-occupied units.
As with wages, I impute CZ-level housing costs by taking weighted averages across the
geographical units in each microdata sample.
C Heterogeneity in crowd-out and local effects by
education
In this appendix, I study heterogeneity by education in the impact of foreign inflows.
I replace the dependent variable of (27) with various outcomes ∆yjrt specific to edu-
cation groups j (college graduates, non-graduates), but keep the same aggregate-level
immigration shock λFrt and controls on the right hand side:
∆yjrt = δu0jt − δu1jλFrt + δu2jbrt + δu3j (nrt−1 − lrt−1) + ArδuAjt + εjrt (A27)
This follows the “total effects” approach recommended by Dustmann, Schoenberg and
Stuhler (2016). I report IV estimates of δu1j by outcome (across columns) and education
group j (rows) in Table A1. To adjust education-specific employment rates, wages and
housing costs for local composition, I apply the methods of Appendices B.2 and B.4 to
the education samples.
Column 1 reports the effects on education-specific population growth ∆ljrt. The
next two columns disaggregate this change into foreign and residual (i.e. native plus
old migrant) contributions to local population: I specify these according to equations
(22) and (23), but using the group j sample. Columns 2-3 show the crowd-out effect
is educationally “balanced”: the college share of both foreign inflows λFjrt (elicited by
the enclave shift-share) and the residual population response λIjrt resemble the existing
33Number of rooms (9 indicators) and bedrooms (6 indicators), an interaction between number of
rooms and bedrooms, building age (up to 9 indicators, depending on cross-section), presence of kitchen,
complete plumbing and condominium status. I also control for a house/apartment dummy, together with
interactions between this and all previously-mentioned variables.
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population. As a result, there is little change in the relative supply of college graduates
(column 1).
Despite this, the adverse effect of foreign inflows on native employment rates falls
almost entirely on non-graduates (column 4). This suggests the (balanced) population
changes in column 1 are understating the labor market pressure on low educated natives.
This may be a consequence of more severe undercoverage of low educated migrants: see
Section 5.1.
Finally, columns 6-9 reveal a small positive effect on the wages of graduate natives;
but they also face larger growth in housing expenditures. Whether this reflects changes
in unobserved housing consumption or prices is open to interpretation. The price in-
terpretation may be relevant if housing units are imperfect substitutes within CZs: for
example, Albouy and Zabek (2016) document growing house price dispersion within cities,
driven mostly by changes in relative neighborhood values. Coupled with the difficulty
of constructing credible local wage deflators, this underscores the advantages of studying
welfare effects using local employment rates (as a sufficient statistic).
D Contributions of inflows and outflows to crowd-
out
It turns out the crowd-out effect is entirely driven by a reduction in migratory inflows to
the affected CZ, rather than an increase in migratory outflows. I present the evidence in
this appendix.
Similarly to Section 6.3, I exploit the longitudinal dimension of the census: respon-
dents were asked where they were living five years previously. One can in principle
construct the relevant variables using microdata, as I do in Section 6.3. But since I do
not need to disaggregate by education for this exercise, I instead use published statistics
on gross migratory flows between all country pairs: these are based on larger samples and
require no geographical imputation. I use data for the periods 1965-70, 1975-80, 1985-90
and 1995-2000, and I aggregate all flows to CZ level.34
My strategy is to re-estimate the unconditional crowd-out equation (27), but replacing
the decadal foreign and residual contributions (to local population growth) with 5-year
34I thank Jack DeWaard for sharing the 1965-70 and 1975-80 flow data. I take the 1985-90 flow data
from the Socioeconomic Data and Application Center at Columbia University: see the P1 STP-28 tables
at http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/data/set/acrp_enhance-migration-1990. I construct the 1995-2000
flows using the C2 A1 and B4 A1 tables on the Census 2000 Migration DVD (kindly made available by Kin
Koerber); see https://www.census.gov/population/www/cen2000/migration/mig_dvd.html. Comparable
data is not available for 2005-2010. Note the published flow data is available for individuals aged 15-64,
rather than my usual 16-64 sample.
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flows. My specification is:
λI5rt = δu0t + δu1λF5rt + δu2 brt + δu3 (nrt−10 − lrt−10) + ArδuAt + εrt (A28)
where the t subscript now designates years, rather than decades (as in the main text), and
λF5rt and λI5rt are respectively the 5-year foreign and internal contributions to changes in log
population. These are constructed in line with equations (22) and (23). Specifically, λF5rt





, where LF5rt is the 5-year inflow into area r from abroad,
and Lrt−5 is the local population at time t−5 (based on census respondents’ reported place






where LIi5rt and LIo5rt are respectively the 5-year inflows and outflows to/from others parts
of the US. Notice that, by construction, Lrt ≡ Lrt−5 + LF5rt + LIi5rt − LIo5rt . Given that the
flows are based on the reports of time t residents, individuals who emigrated from the
US between t − 5 and t are excluded from this data. But to the extent that emigration
is a response to an individual’s local economic environment, my estimates should then
understate the extent of crowd-out.
I do not observe employment outcomes between census years (i.e. at 5 year intervals),
so I choose to use the same right hand side variables as in equation (27): the decadal
Bartik shift-share brt (which predicts employment growth between t − 10 and t), the
employment rate lagged ten years, and the amenity controls. The mismatch in time
periods is not ideal, and one should keep this in mind when interpreting the estimates.
I report OLS and IV estimates in Table A2. I instrument λF5rt using a 5-year enclave
shift-share, constructed to predict the 5-year flow and based on migrant settlement pat-
terns in t − 5. I construct these settlement patterns using migrants’ reported historical
residence in the census microdata of year t (i.e. following a similar procedure to the
longitudinal estimates of Section 6.3). I instrument the lagged employment rate using
the lagged decadal Bartik shift-share.
The standard errors on the OLS estimates are too large to make definitive statements.
But the IV estimates tell a much clearer story. Column 4 reports the basic δu1 estimate,
based on equation (A28). This points to a large crowding out effect (-1.6), somewhat in
excess of one-for-one (though not significantly different). In the next two columns, I dis-
aggregate the effect into (approximate) contributions from internal inflows and outflows:











. The crowding out effect
is entirely driven by variation in inflows rather than outflows.
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E Undercoverage bias: Supplementary theory and
estimates
E.1 Bias in conditional crowd-out estimates
In this section, I show how I derive equations (31) and (32), which describe the bias in
the conditional crowd-out estimators, δ̂c1 and δ̂c2. From Section 5.3, I have the following
expressions for the observed (biased) foreign inflow λ̂Frt and employment growth ∆n̂rt:
λ̂Frt = (1− π)λFrt (A29)
∆n̂rt = ∆nrt − πλFrt (A30)
where λFrt and ∆nrt are their true counterparts. The true equation for the (net) internal
inflow is:
λIrt = −δc1λFrt + δc2∆nrt (A31)
However, I am only able to estimate:
λIrt = −δ̂c1λ̂Frt + δ̂c2∆n̂rt (A32)
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from which equations (31) and (32) follow.
E.2 Direct estimates of employment elasticity η
In this section, I offer direct estimates of the employment elasticity η to local population.
For simplicity, the model in the main text assumes that employment adjusts instanta-
neously: equation (11) contains no dynamic terms. But Amior and Manning (2018) do
find evidence of such dynamics, and their Online Appendices show how one can derive
an estimating equation of the following form:
∆nrt = ηt + η1∆lrt + η2 (nrt−1 − lrt−1) + η3brt + ArηAt + εrt (A43)
The lagged employment rate allows for sluggish adjustment of labor demand to historical
shocks: firms should cut employment if labor supply is initially sparse and costly (i.e. if
nrt−1−lrt−1 is large). The current Bartik brt on the right-hand side controls for observable
components of contemporaneous labor demand shocks.
New to this paper, I extend this specification by allowing for distinct effects of foreign
and (net) internal inflows:
∆nrt = ηt + η1FλFrt + η1IλIrt + η2 (nrt−1 − lrt−1) + η3brt + ArηAt + εrt (A44)
I present first stage estimates for both (A43) and (A44) in Table A3, and OLS and
IV estimates in Table A4. Clearly, the OLS estimates cannot be interpreted causally.
Omitted demand shocks in the errors will generate a confounding positive correlation
between employment on the left hand side and population on the right. The natural
instrument for population growth ∆lrt is the enclave shift-share. However, as column 1
of Table A3 shows, this has no power: this reflects the one-for-one crowd-out identified in
the main text. In column 2, like Beaudry, Green and Sand (2018) and Amior and Manning
(2018), I use maximum January temperature as an instrument: Rappaport (2007) shows
that Americans have been moving to places with milder winters. (In these specifications,
I exclude January temperature and its interactions with year effects from the Ar amenity
vector on the right hand side.) This has a strong positive effect on population.
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To identify the impact of λFrt and λIrt separately in (A44), I use both the enclave shift-
share and January temperature as instruments. As expected, the shift-share has a large
positive effect on λFrt (column 3 of Table A3) and a large negative effect on λIrt (column 4).
In contrast, January temperature has a large positive effect on λIrt, but matters less for
λFrt. As before, I instrument the lagged employment rate with the lagged Bartik: columns
5-7 of Table A3 show a strong first stage.
I now turn to the OLS and IV estimates of (A43) and (A44) in Table A4. The OLS
elasticity to ∆lrt is essentially 1 (column 1), and the effects of λFrt and λIrt are 0.87 and
0.99 respectively (column 2). Once I apply the instrument, I estimate smaller effects -
as one might expect. Column 3, which instruments ∆lrt with the enclave shift-share,
has insufficient power to identify anything - for the reasons explained above. Once I use
the January temperature instrument, I identify an elasticity to ∆lrt of 0.74.35 And in
column 4, the effects of λFrt and λIrt are now 0.61 and 0.78 respectively. If natives and
migrants supply identical labor, these should be identical. But since they are identified
using divergent sources of variation (i.e. enclaves and temperature), it is perhaps unwise
to over-interpret the gap between them.
E.3 Identification of true employment elasticity η and under-
coverage bias π
Using my estimates of η from Table A4 , I now show how one can identify the under-
coverage bias π. Given I am studying crowd-out in response to immigration, I choose to
identify η with the elasticity of employment to λFrt, i.e. η1F in (A44).
The main challenge is that any undercoverage will bias my estimate of η1F upwards;
but the form of this bias is known. To derive an expression for the bias, I follow similar
steps to those of Section E.1. Abstracting from contemporaneous shocks and initial
conditions in (A44), the true model for employment can be written as:
∆nrt = η1FλFrt + η1IλIrt (A45)
But since I only observe ∆nrt and λFrt with error, I estimate:
∆n̂rt = η̂1F λ̂Frt + η̂1IλIrt (A46)
where ∆n̂rt and λ̂Frt are defined as in (A29) and (A30). The coefficients η̂1F and η̂1I will
35Amior and Manning (2018) estimate a slightly larger η1 of 0.79. This can be attributed to two
differences: they use one more decade of data (their sample includes the 1950s), and they do not adjust
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. It follows from (A47)
that η̂1I identifies η1I , while η̂1F is upward biased:
η̂1F − η1F = πη̂1F (A48)
Equation (A48) describes a negative relationship between the true η1F and π, for a given
η̂1F estimate (which I set as 0.605, based on column 4 of Table A4). Together with the
positive (η, π) relationship described in equation (33) and Figure 1 in the main text (and
identifying η with η1F ), this yields a two-equation system:
π = η̂1F − η
η̂1F
(A49)
π = 1− (1− η) δ̂
c
2






Using my preferred estimates of η̂1F = 0.605, δ̂c1 = 0.913, δ̂c2 = 0.743 and δ̂u1 = 1.096 (see
Section 5.5), I identify the true employment elasticity η as 0.44 and undercoverage bias
π as 0.27.
F Robustness of crowd-out: Supplementary estimates
In Section 6 in the main text, I subject my estimates of unconditional crowd-out, δu1 , to a
broad range of robustness tests. In some cases, I only offer short summaries of these tests:
this appendix presents the complete details and also regression tables. Sections F.1-F.7
deal with aggregate-level crowd-out (corresponding to Section 6.1 in the main text); and
Section F.8 studies the role of cohort effects in within-area estimates (corresponding to
Section 6.4).
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F.1 Graphical illustration of crowd-out estimates
One concern is that my δu1 estimate may be driven by outliers. To address this question,
Figure A1 illustrates the correlation underlying the basic OLS and IV estimates of δu1 (in
columns 3 and 4 of Table 3).
For the OLS plot, I extract residuals from regressions of both the net internal flow λIrt
and foreign inflow λFrt on the remaining controls: the initial employment rate, the current
Bartik shift-share, year effects and the amenity variables (interacted with year effects).
And I then plot the λIrt residuals against those of λFrt.
For IV, I apply the same Frisch-Waugh logic to two-stage least squares. I first gen-
erate predictions of the two endogenous variables (the foreign inflow, λFrt, and the initial
employment rate, nrt−1 − lrt−1), based on the first stage regressions (using the enclave
shift-share mrt and lagged Bartik brt−1 instruments). I then extract residuals from re-
gressions of both λIrt and the predicted λFrt on the remaining controls: the predicted initial
employment rate, the current Bartik shift-share, year effects and the amenity variables
(interacted with year effects). And as before, I then plot the λIrt residuals against those
of λFrt.
The marker size in these figures is proportional to the initial population share weights.
The fit lines’ (weighted) slopes are identical to the δu1 estimates in columns 3 and 4 in
Table 3. The standard errors are of course different: I do not cluster errors in Figure A1;
and for IV, the naive two-step estimation does not account for sampling error in the first
stage. In any case, the main take-away is that the δu1 estimates are not visibly driven by
outliers.
F.2 CZ sample and weighting
In columns 1-5 of Table A5, I show the crowding out effect is robust to different CZ
samples and weighting choices. For comparison, column 1 of Table A5 is identical to the
basic IV unconditional crowd-out specification in Table 3 (column 4) in the main text.
My basic 722 CZ sample is comprehensive of the Continental US, and includes many
rural areas and small towns. However, much of the literature focuses on metropolitan
areas. In column 2, I restrict my sample to the largest 100 CZs (based on the pop-
ulation of 16-64s in 1960): the coefficient estimates are almost identical to column 1.
The standard error on the crowd-out effect δu1 is also unchanged, but recall these are
population-weighted estimates. Butcher and Card (1991) and Wright, Ellis and Reibel
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(1997) find some evidence of larger crowd-out in the top five migrant destinations (Los
Angeles, New York, Chicago, Miami and San Francisco): column 3 shows the coefficient
estimate declines only marginally (to -0.87) when I omit these, though the standard error
does now increase to 0.2.
Given the skew in the spatial distribution of foreign inflows, one may also be concerned
that the estimates are driven by CZs facing unusually high inflows. In column 4, I
exclude observations with values of the enclave shift-share mrt above 0.1, which is the
98th percentile (the maximum value is 0.29: see Table 1). But again, this makes little
difference.
Finally, my main estimates are weighted by initial population share, which ensures
they are largely driven by variation across larger CZs. But when I remove these weights
in column 5, the coefficient is remarkably similar (-0.94 compared to -1.1); though the
standard error is somewhat larger. This suggests the effects are not merely driven by
large CZs, consistent with the patterns in Figure A1.
F.3 Cross-state and within-state variation
In the main text, I have focused on geographical crowd-out across CZs. Interestingly,
using a within-area specification, Borjas (2006) finds the extent of crowd-out is smaller
at higher-level geographical units, based on comparisons of estimates for census divisions,
states and metropolitan areas. But using my aggregate-level specification, I show there is
substantial crowd-out both across and within states: I cannot reject a one-for-one effect
in either case.
As before, I base my estimates on equation (27) in the main text, though I replace the
lagged employment rate control (nrt−1 − lrt−1) with lagged Bartik and enclave shift-share
controls, brt−1 and mrt−1. This is because I cannot successfully identify the lagged em-
ployment rate using the lagged Bartik instrument in the state-level data. For comparison,
I include an equivalent CZ specification in column 6, which is identical to column 6 of
Table 3 (in the main text). The crowd-out effect is slightly smaller in this specification
(-0.79 compared to -1.1 in column 1): as I explain in Section 4.3, this is likely to reflect
omitted historical demand shocks.
In column 7, I replicate the column 6 specification using state-level data. In line
with my CZ estimates, I control for state-level amenity effects: a binary indicator for
a coastal state (ocean or Great Lakes), maximum January temperature, maximum July
temperature, mean July relative humidity, and log state-level population density in 1900
(see Section 3). I also control for year effects and a full set of interactions between the
amenity variables and year effects. My sample consists of the 48 states of the continental
US, with the District of Columbia merged into Maryland. The estimated crowd-out effect
in column 7 is a little larger (reaching -0.94); though unsurprisingly, the standard error
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increases also.
Column 7 shows there is large crowd-out across states. But do we see similar effects
within states? To address this question, I replicate the column 6 specification (for CZ
data) in column 8, but now controlling for state fixed effects. The crowd-out effect is
similar to column 7. This suggests that CZ crowd-out is equally driven by variation
across and within states.
F.4 Functional form
In Table A6, I explore the robustness of my unconditional crowd-out estimates to ques-
tions of empirical specification. For comparison, column 1 of Table A6 replicates the
basic unconditional IV crowd-out specification in Table 3 (column 4) in the main text.
I begin in column 2 with the choice of functional form. In my basic specification (27),
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: see e.g. Card (2001),
Peri and Sparber (2011) and Card and Peri (2016). Column 2 re-estimates (27) using











o(−r)t is the predicted number of incoming migrants between t− 1 and t:
see equation (25). But this makes little difference to the estimate.
F.5 Specification of instruments
In columns 3-4 of Table A6, I consider the specification of my enclave shift-share instru-











o(−r)t is the predicted number of incoming migrants between t− 1
and t (see Appendix F.4). Notice that here and in the main text (see equation (25)),
I use the t − 1 migrant settlement patterns (in φort−1) to predict foreign inflows in each
subsequent decade. But others have taken a different approach: for example, Hunt (2017)
predicts inflows in all decades from 1940 to 2010 using the 1940 settlement patterns. In











migrant inflow based on 1960 settlement patterns, φor60, for every decade. The crowd-out
effect is now somewhat larger (-1.3), though it is not significantly different from -1. The
robustness of my results to this modification should not be surprising: since I am already
controlling for local conditions at t − 1 (using the initial employment rate), an earlier
base year should not offer any advantages in terms of exogeneity (to compensate for the
loss of predictive power).
58
Another possible concern is the source of the instrument’s predictive power. Suppose
the predicted number of incoming migrants, ΛFrt, is largely noise. Then, variation in Lrt−1
may generate an artificial positive correlation between the endogenous variable and the
instrument: see Clemens and Hunt (2019). To address this concern, in column 4, I replace
the instrument (which is expressed relative to the initial population) with the predicted
inflow of new migrants in levels, i.e. ΛFrt. But again, this has little effect on the crowding
out estimate or even its standard error.
F.6 Specification in levels
Related to the previous point, some papers have estimated crowd-out using a specification
expressed entirely in levels (e.g. Wright, Ellis and Reibel, 1997; Wozniak and Murray,
2012). Building on equation (27), a specification in levels would be:
∆Lrt − LFrt = δuL0t − δuL1 LFrt + δuL2 brt + δuL3 (nrt−1 − lrt−1) + ArδuLAt + εrt (A51)
where the dependent variable is the change in local population, less the stock of new
immigrants; and the key regressor LFrt is simply the number of new immigrants. I estimate
(A51) in column 5 of Table A6, yielding a coefficient on LFrt of just −0.23. However, local
population is an important omitted variable in this specification (Wright, Ellis and Reibel,
1997; Peri and Sparber, 2011; Wozniak and Murray, 2012): through a simple scale effect,
local population will be correlated with both the inflow of new immigrants and subsequent
(absolute) population change. To address this concern, Wozniak and Murray recommend
controlling for local fixed effects. Once I include CZ fixed effects (column 6), the LFrt effect
is again remarkably close to -1. Notice this specification is also immune to the criticism
of Clemens and Hunt (2019), described in Appendix F.5, of spurious correlation in the
population denominator.
F.7 Controlling for time-invariant local trends
In column 7 of Table A6, I apply CZ fixed effects directly to the basic specification in
column 1. These effectively partial out CZ-specific linear trends in population. This
approach is similar in spirit to the double differencing methodology (comparing changes
before and after 1970) of Borjas, Freeman and Katz (1997) and is recommended by
Hong and McLaren (2015). In principle, the fixed effects should remove time-invariant
unobserved components of the amenity, supply or demand changes in equation (27).
However, their inclusion is empirically demanding in such a short panel, especially given
the strong persistence in the enclave instrument mrt. And as Aydemir and Borjas (2011)
argue, measurement error may be more of a problem here. With population weights, I
estimate a crowd-out effect of -0.63 with a very large standard error (0.61).
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In column 8, to ease the demands of the specification, I replace the lagged employment
rate (i.e. the initial conditions) with historical shocks: a lagged Bartik brt−1 and lagged
enclave shift-share mrt−1, similarly to column 6 of Table 3. I now estimate much larger
crowd-out of -1.35, with a standard error of just 0.26. This is remarkably precise, given
the short length (just five decades) of the CZ panel.
F.8 Cohort effects in within-area estimates
The difference between the pooled cross-section and longitudinal estimates in Table 8 is
suggestive of large cohort effects (see Section 6.3). In Table A7, I present more direct
evidence for cohort effects (among natives), by exploiting information in the census on
natives’ place of birth.
I need to conduct this analysis at state level (rather than CZ), because the census only
reports place of birth by state. My sample consists of the 48 states of the continental US
(with the District of Columbia merged into Maryland) and three decadal observations
(over 1970-2000, for comparability with the estimates in Table 8). In columns 1-3 of
Table A7, I begin by estimating δw1 in equation (34) in a pooled cross-section of states,
using the education-specific enclave instrument mjrt. Reassuringly, the first stage and IV
estimates are almost identical to the CZ-equivalent in column 1-3 of Table 8.
Recall the dependent variable in column 3, λI,Njrt , is the contribution of natives to
group j population growth among state r residents. In column 4, I now replace this with
λI,NBPjrt: the contribution of natives to skill j population growth among those born (rather
than residing) in state r. The column 4 estimates will now describe the contribution
of cohort effects to state r’s education composition (though since a third of Americans
live outside their birth state, it should understate any such effects). Remarkably, these
numbers are all larger than the state of residence effects in columns 2-3; and for the first
two delineations, substantially so.
In other words, foreign inflows to a given state exert a larger impact on the education
composition of natives born in that state (i.e. the pure birth cohort effect) than on those
residing in it (which accounts for both birth cohorts and mobility). This suggests any
contribution of internal mobility to the δw1 estimate in columns 2-3 is more than fully
offset by cohort effects.
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G Reconciliation with Card (2007)
G.1 Empirical specification
In this appendix, I attempt to reconcile my results with a well-known recent analysis of
aggregate-level crowd-out in Card (2007). Card finds no significant evidence of crowd-
out, and I attribute the difference in results to his choice of right hand side controls. He
estimates a model of “unconditional crowd-out” (using my terminology) in the 1980s and
1990s, based on an empirical specification akin to (27):
∆LNrt
Lrt−1
= δu0t − δu1
∆LMrt
Lrt−1
+ δuL logLrt−1 + εurt (A52)
where the dependent variable is the contribution of natives, LNrt, to local population
growth; and the regressor of interest is the contribution of migrants (both new and old),
LMrt . To be precise, Card actually uses total population growth ∆LrtLrt−1 as the dependent
variable, but the difference is just cosmetic: it raises the δu1 coefficient by 1 (see Peri and
Sparber, 2011). Card also controls for initial log population, logLrt−1, on the right-hand
side.
There are a number of differences between my empirical specification (27) and Card’s,
most of which are relatively trivial. While I study the effect of new immigrants on internal
mobility, Card estimates the effect of the total migrant stock (both new and old) on the
local native population; but as Table 7 (row J) shows, this makes little difference to the

















; but as I discuss in
Appendix F.4, this also makes little difference. In terms of geography, Card studies 100
large cities (rather than my comprehensive CZ sample); but as Appendix F.2 shows, my
crowd-out estimates are stable across different CZ samples. Finally, Card instruments
∆LMrt
Lrt−1




: this is less targeted than my own
instrument in (25), which is constructed within origin groups (as in Card, 2001); but the
two are in practice closely correlated.
But unlike the differences listed above, the choice of controls does play an important
role. There are two particular concerns. First, Card does not control for local demand
and amenity shifters, which will draw both native and migrant inflows (and thereby bias
the crowd-out effect towards zero). These shocks will not be excluded by the lagged
migrant share instrument if they are very persistent (as in e.g. Amior and Manning,
2018) and exert large influence on immigrants’ location choices (as in e.g. Amior, 2020).
Second, there are legitimate concerns over the the lagged population control (logLrt−1)
which Card does include. Card justifies this control by reference to Wright, Ellis and
Reibel (1997), who emphasize that local changes in native population are closely corre-
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lated with city size. This is certainly a concern for Wright, Ellis and Reibel, since they
specify native population changes in absolute terms (so population will generate a simple
scale effect: see Appendix F.6); but it is not clear why it should apply to a specification
like (A52) which studies native changes relative to the initial population level. Indeed, in
the presence of omitted amenity or demand shocks, variation in lagged population Lrt−1
may generate a spurious negative correlation between the logLrt−1 control and the left




(where population appears in the denominator). Since lagged
population is correlated with the instrument (migrants are known to cluster in large cities:
Albert and Monras, 2018), this endogenous control may bias the δu1 estimate.
G.2 Estimates
To study this question further, I attempt a reconciliation in Table A8. Following Card, I
estimate the model using decadal census data, separately for the 1980-90 period (Panel
A) and 1990-2000 (Panel B). In practice, for both the 1980s and 1990s models, Card uses
the 1980 migrant share as an instrument and the 1980 population as a control; and for
consistency, I do the same.
Card estimates his model using a sample of the largest 100 MSAs and weights obser-
vations by 1980 population, with population stocks corresponding to 16-65s. I record his





is 0.5 (with a 0.4 standard error), i.e. each new migrant attracts 0.5 additional
natives. And for the 1990s, the coefficient is -0.8 (suggesting large crowd-out), though
with a large standard error of 0.6 (so there is little information here).36 Unfortunately,
I have been unable to replicate his estimates for the MSA sample. This may be because
the MSA definitions in the public microdata are inconsistent over time: Card may have
adjusted for this, but I am not sure exactly how. Instead, in column 2, I have replicated
his model using the top 100 CZs in my own data (for 16-64s). My estimates for both
decades are closer to zero (0.2 and -0.2 respectively), with standard errors of just 0.2.
Though the coefficients do differ somewhat from Card’s MSA estimates, the difference is
not statistically significant (given his large standard errors).
Card controls for 1980 population, but does not report the coefficient: hence the “?”
in column 1. In column 2, I estimate this effect as -0.04 or -0.05, with a standard error
of just 0.01. I have argued this negative effect may be driven by a spurious correlation





36Using his population growth dependent variable, these come out as 1.5 and 0.2 respectively, from
which I subtract 1. See the final column of Table 3 in Card (2007).
37Note the population control in the 1990s model is more accurately described as logLrt−2 rather than
logLrt−1. But since population is heavily correlated over time, this makes little difference is practice.
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. And in my




has a mean of about 0.05 in the 1980s and 0.06 in the 1990s (which
closely matches the estimated logLrt−1 coefficients).
This kind of spurious correlation becomes a problem in the presence of omitted
amenity and demand shifters (which may generate sizeable variation in logLrt−1). To
the extent these effects are persistent over time, one might account for them by control-
ling for lagged population growth (rather than the lagged level). To this end, I control
in column 3 additionally for local population in 1970. The effect of 1980 population now
takes a large positive coefficient (of about 0.7 in each decade), and the 1970 population
takes an equal and opposite coefficient: this is clearly indicative of a lagged growth effect.
At the same time, I now begin to see some evidence of crowd-out: the coefficient on
∆LMrt
Lrt−1
drops to -0.5 in the 1980s and -1.1 in the 1990s (though with large standard errors).
Of course, a lagged growth control is not an ideal solution: in a dynamic setting, one
may continue to worry about endogeneity; and it does not deal with contemporaneous
innovations to demand.
In column 4, I remove both population controls. This makes little difference to the
crowd-out estimates, but the standard errors do contract (especially for the 1990s). In
column 5, I control for a contemporaneous Bartik industry shift-share, which accounts for
predictable shifts in local labor demand (given initial industrial composition). This causes
the crowd-out effect to expand to one-for-one in the 1980s also. In column 6, I control
for the amenity effects described in Section 3 (climate, coastline, historical density, CZ
isolation): this does not affect the coefficients (which remain above -1), but reduces the
standard errors considerably (to about 0.3). I do not control for the lagged employment
rate in this exercise, because I do not have sufficient power to identify its effect (with the
lagged Bartik instrument) in this smaller sample.
In column 7, I return the 1980 population control to the model: in the presence of
the demand and amenity controls, this now takes a zero effect. This further supports
my contention that the population control in column 2 is picking up a spurious correla-
tion with the dependent variable’s denominator, driven by omitted demand and amenity
effects (which column 7 now holds fixed).
Finally, in column 8, I expand the sample to all 722 CZs. The coefficients are little
affected, but the standard errors contract further. This suggests that the crowd-out effects
do not depend on the particular CZ sample (consistent with the evidence in Appendix
F.2), though a larger sample does improve precision.
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H Reconciliation with Card (2001)
H.1 Overview
In this appendix, I attempt to reconcile my results with Card’s (2001) seminal analysis
of within-area crowd-out, i.e. δw1 in (34). As I have argued in Section 6.2, within-area
estimates do not identify aggregate-level crowd-out, which is the focus of my paper. This
is because they do not account for the local impact which immigrants exert outside their
skill group; and hence, as I show in Section 6.3, they are remarkably sensitive to the chosen
delineation of skill groups (which determines the degree of productive substitutability, σ).
Nevertheless, Card’s (2001) within-area estimates do appear to conflict with my own
in Table 8. When I exploit longitudinal residential information in the US census (which
neutralizes the contribution of cohort effects), I do estimate large negative effects for
at least some skill group delineations. However, using similar longitudinal data, Card
estimates a small positive effect of foreign inflows, with each new immigrant to an area-
skill cell attracting (on net) 0.25 additional residents.
In this appendix, I attempt to reconcile my results with his. The divergence of our
estimates is mostly explained by two factors. First, Card uses a fine skill delineation
with six imputed occupation groups (which will admit a large degree of productive sub-
stitutability σ). Indeed, as my model in Section 6.2 predicts, I show the crowd-out effects
are considerably larger for more aggregated skill delineations. Second, Card controls for
a range of cell-level demographic characteristics, which absorb much of the migration
shock’s variation. In principle, these controls may be picking up exogenous skill-specific
shocks which I have neglected, though it is not clear (ex ante) what these might be. Fur-
thermore, to the extent that the migration shocks and internal responses are persistent
over time (as the evidence suggests), there is legitimate concern that they are endogenous
to the dependent variable.
H.2 Data and empirical specification
In line with Card (2001), for this replication exercise, I study variation across the 175
largest MSAs in the 5% census extract of 1990.38 The sample is restricted to individu-
als aged 16 to 68 with more than one year of potential experience. In constructing his
sample, Card uses all foreign-born individuals in the census extract and a 25% random
sample of the native-born. I instead use the full sample of natives, and this may (at least
partly) account for some small discrepancies between his estimates and my replication.
38The 1990 census microdata includes sub-state geographical identifiers known as Public Use
Microdata Areas (PUMAs), and a concordance between PUMAs and MSAs can be found at:
https://usa.ipums.org/usa/volii/puma.shtml. A number of PUMAs straddle MSA boundaries; and fol-
lowing Card, I allocate the population of a given PUMA to an MSA if at least half that PUMA’s
population resides in the MSA.
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Card delineates six skill groups by probabilistically assigning individuals into occupation
categories (laborers and low skilled services; operative and craft; clerical; sales; managers;
professional and technical), conditional on their education and demographic characteris-
tics. This assignment is based on predictions from a multinomial logit model, estimated
separately for native men, native women, migrant men and migrant women; and I follow
the procedure set out in his appendix. This approach offers the advantage of account-
ing for any occupational downgrading of migrants (see e.g. Dustmann, Schoenberg and
Stuhler, 2016).
Card estimates a specification very similar to (34), except he uses first order approx-





= δw0 − δw1
LFjr,1990
Ljr,1985
+Xjr,1985δwX + dj + dr + εjr (A53)
where Ljr,1990 is the population of skill group j in area r in the census year (1990); Ljr,1985
is the local population five years previously, based on responses to the 1990 census; and
LFjr,1990 is the number of immigrants in the skill-area cell in 1990 who were living abroad
in 1985. Thus, the dependent variable is the contribution of natives and earlier (pre-1985)
migrants to population growth (net of emigrants from the US, who do not appear in the




is the contribution of immigration to that growth. To be
more precise, Card actually uses the total (within-cell) population growth Ljr,1990−Ljr,1985
Ljr,1985
as the dependent variable, but this is a cosmetic difference: it simply adds a value of 1 to
the δw1 coefficient (see Peri and Sparber, 2011). Xjr,1985 is a vector of mean characteristics
of individuals in the (j, r) cell in 1985: these consist of mean age, mean age squared,
mean years of schooling and fraction black, separately for both natives and migrants in
the cell, and (for migrants only) mean years in the US. Finally, dj and dr are full sets of
skill group and area fixed effects respectively.












, where φor,1985 is the share of origin o migrants who lived in
area r in 1985, and LFoj,1990 is the number of new origin o migrants who arrived in the US
between 1985 and 1990. I use the same 17 origin country groups as Card.
H.3 Estimates
In his baseline OLS specification (with 175 MSAs and observations weighted by cell




coefficient (i.e. the negative of δw1 ) as 0.25, with
a standard error of 0.04.39 Card’s IV estimate is also 0.25, but with a standard error of
0.05. That is, each new immigrant in a given MSA-skill cell attracts an additional 0.25
39Using his population growth dependent variable, this comes out as 1.25 - from which I subtract 1.
See the final column of Table 4 of Card (2001).
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workers to the same cell (relative to other cells). I record these estimates in column 1 of
Table A9.
I attempt to replicate these estimates in column 2 and achieve similar numbers for
Card’s six-group occupation scheme (top row). In the second row, I re-estimate the model
using a classification with just two imputed occupation groups: the first group aggregates
all those two-digit occupations with less than 40% college share in 1990; and the second
all those with more than 40%.40 I assign individuals probabilistically to these groups
using the same multinomial logit procedure (conditioning on the same demographic char-
acteristics) as for Card’s six group delineation. In the final row of each panel, I study a
two-group education classification (college graduates and non-graduates), for comparison
with Table 8. Looking at column 2, it appears that the choice of skill delineation makes
no significant difference to the estimates. In column 3, I cluster errors by state, which
expands the standard errors (as one might expect).
Much of the action comes in column 4, when I exclude the mean demographic controls
in Xjr from the right hand side. All the estimates are now negative; and they are
statistically significant for the two-group occupation and education schemes, with IV
coefficients of -0.47 and -2.14 respectively. As my model in Section 6.2 predicts, Card’s
fine six-group delineation (which will admit greater productive substitutability) generates
a smaller δw1 estimate. It is also not surprising that, among the two-group schemes, the
education classification generates a larger δw1 : the imputed occupations essentially mix
individuals from the education groups, so any effect will be more diluted.
Why do the Xjr controls make such a difference? Statistically, they absorb much of
the (within-area) variation in the migration shock: a regression of the enclave instrument
on the dj and dr fixed effects yields an R squared of 0.858, and including the controls
raises the R squared to 0.928. In principle, these controls may be picking up exogenous
skill-specific shocks which I have neglected, though it is not clear (ex ante) what these
might be. Furthermore, to the extent that the migration shocks and internal responses
are persistent over time (as the evidence suggests), there is legitimate concern that they
are endogenous to the dependent variable: foreign and internal mobility are liable to shift
the demographic characteristics of the area-skill cells.
Column 5 extends the geographical sample to all identifiable MSAs (raising the total
from 175 to 320), and column 6 extends it to cover 49 additional regions consisting of the
non-metro areas in each state41 (so 369 areas in total). The latter modification ensures
40The occupational distribution in college share is strongly bipolar, and 40% is the natural dividing
line.
41Based on the allocation procedure described above, all of New Jersey is already classified as part of
an MSA. The “49 additional regions” cover the remaining 49 states.
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the area sample is comprehensive of the US, similarly to the CZs I use in the main text.
These sample extensions make the coefficients larger (more negative) for the occupation
delineations (with the OLS and IV coefficients now consistently significant); but the
education scheme is little affected in IV.










respectively, using the functional form I apply elsewhere in the
paper: see equations (22) and (23). This makes a negligible difference to the results. The
final column can now be compared to my longitudinal estimates in the main text (column
5 of Table 8): the estimates for the graduate/non-graduate scheme look similar.
To summarize, Table 8 shows that Card’s estimates are very sensitive to the skill
delineation, in the direction my model predicts. This reflects the fact that within-area
estimates do not identify aggregate-level crowd-out, as I explain in Section 6.2. Beyond
this, his choice of controls (which I argue may be problematic) play an important role.
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Tables and figures
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Means by decade Percentiles
1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 5th 50th 95th Max
Foreign inflow: λFrt 0.020 0.033 0.047 0.065 0.060 0.000 0.007 0.057 0.211
Enclave shift-share: mrt 0.016 0.025 0.038 0.056 0.053 0.000 0.007 0.054 0.289
Emp rate (end of decade) 0.624 0.659 0.707 0.694 0.665 0.553 0.648 0.752 0.810
Bartik shift-share: brt 0.173 0.227 0.142 0.095 0.056 -0.130 0.088 0.227 0.296
This table reports descriptive statistics for key variables of interest: population-weighted means by decade,
and percentiles of the full distribution. Employment rates are adjusted for local demographic composition.
Table 2: First stage for crowding out estimates
Foreign inflow: λFrt Emp growth: ∆nrt Lagged ER: nrt−1 − lrt−1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Current enclave: mrt 0.919*** 1.229*** 1.173*** -0.233** -0.022 0.475***
(0.084) (0.119) (0.105) (0.113) (0.122) (0.175)
Lagged enclave: mrt−1 -0.399*** -0.377*** -0.640***
(0.056) (0.053) (0.139)
Current Bartik: brt 0.092*** 0.078*** 0.121*** 0.839*** -0.134* -0.156**
(0.025) (0.026) (0.034) (0.124) (0.069) (0.067)
Lagged Bartik: brt−1 0.063*** 0.064*** 0.160*** 0.122* 0.371*** 0.373***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.028) (0.068) (0.063) (0.062)
Amenity×yr controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year sample 60-10 60-10 70-10 60-10 60-10 60-10
Observations 3,610 3,610 2,888 3,610 3,610 3,610
This table reports first stage estimates corresponding to the crowding out specifications in Table 3. All specifications
control for year effects and the amenity variables (interacted with year effects). The sample consists of (up to) five decadal
observations (from 1960 to 2010) across 722 CZs. Column 3 omits the 1970s, to correspond with the IV specification
in column 7 of Table 3. Errors are clustered by state, and robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Each
observation is weighted by the lagged local population share. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 3: Estimates of conditional and unconditional crowd-out
Conditional Unconditional
Net internal flows: λIrt Net internal flows: λIrt Lagged: λIrt−1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Foreign inflow: λFrt -0.883*** -0.913*** -0.761*** -1.096*** -1.109*** -0.787*** -0.235
(0.048) (0.065) (0.200) (0.130) (0.153) (0.167) (0.228)
Emp growth: ∆nrt 0.882*** 0.743***
(0.017) (0.043)
Lagged ER: nrt−1 − lrt−1 0.251*** 0.556*** 0.520*** 0.831*** 0.833***
(0.021) (0.105) (0.072) (0.207) (0.221)
Current Bartik: brt 0.646*** 0.677*** 0.679*** 0.524*** -0.071
(0.109) (0.099) (0.096) (0.119) (0.168)
Lagged Bartik: brt−1 0.290*** 0.907***
(0.060) (0.103)
Lagged enclave: mrt−1 0.016 -0.388*** -0.984***
(0.161) (0.124) (0.167)
Specification OLS IV OLS IV IV IV IV
Instruments - mrt, brt, brt−1 - mrt, brt−1 mrt, brt−1 mrt mrt
F-stat for λFrt - 93.68 - 126.47 54.88 106.79 124.92
F-stat for ∆nrt - 84.09 - - - - -
F-stat for nrt−1 − lrt−1 - 56.93 - 34.70 31.00 - -
Amenity×yr controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year sample 60-10 60-10 60-10 60-10 60-10 60-10 70-10
Observations 3,610 3,610 3,610 3,610 3,610 3,610 2,888
Columns 1-2 report OLS and IV estimates of the conditional crowding out specification (26), and columns 3-7 report the unconditional
specification (27). There are (up to) three endogenous variables: the foreign inflow, λFrt, the log employment change, and the lagged
log employment rate. The corresponding instruments are the enclave shift-share mrt and the current and lagged Bartiks. The sample
consists of (up to) five decadal observations (from 1960 to 2010) across 722 CZs. Column 7 replaces the dependent variable with its
lag, so it omits the initial decade. I report Sanderson-Windmeijer F-statistics which account for multiple endogenous variables. Errors
are clustered by state, and robust standard errors are in parentheses. Observations are weighted by lagged local population share. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 4: IV effects of foreign inflows on local labor market outcomes
Employment rates Nominal wages Housing costs
Native Migrant Native Migrant Rents Prices
Current Current Current Lagged Current
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Foreign inflow: λFrt -0.210*** -0.190** -0.350*** -0.022 -0.236*** 0.034 0.020 0.105 0.319
(0.057) (0.092) (0.075) (0.061) (0.055) (0.124) (0.077) (0.114) (0.284)
Lagged ER: nrt−1 − lrt−1 -0.411*** -0.414*** -0.469** -0.875*** -0.231 -0.420** -0.690**
(0.087) (0.091) (0.204) (0.211) (0.291) (0.175) (0.348)
Current Bartik: brt 0.259*** 0.255*** 0.333*** 0.024 0.192** 0.111 0.175 0.474*** 0.691***
(0.036) (0.034) (0.038) (0.058) (0.081) (0.111) (0.107) (0.098) (0.204)
Lagged Bartik: brt−1 -0.144*** 0.069*
(0.024) (0.036)
Lagged enclave: mrt−1 -0.024 0.177** -0.216***
(0.079) (0.076) (0.063)
Instruments mrt, brt−1 mrt, brt−1 mrt mrt mrt, brt−1 mrt, brt−1 mrt, brt−1 mrt, brt−1 mrt, brt−1
Amenity×yr controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year sample 60-10 60-10 60-10 70-10 60-10 60-10 60-10 60-10 60-10
Observations 3,610 3,610 3,610 2,888 3,599 3,610 3,610 3,610 3,610
This table reports estimates of (27), but replacing the dependent variable with various local outcomes: changes in the log (composition-adjusted) employment
rate and mean residualized wage, separately for natives and migrants, and residualized housing rents and prices. See notes under Table 3 for further details
about the specification, and see Table 2 for the first stage. The observation count is a little smaller in column 5: I am unable to compute composition-
adjusted migrant employment rates for 11 small CZs in the 1960s. Errors are clustered by state, and robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Each observation is weighted by the lagged local population share. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 5: Conditional and unconditional IV crowd-out by decade
Conditional crowd-out Unconditional crowd-out
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Foreign inflow λFrt -0.913*** -0.837*** -1.066*** -1.096*** -1.678*** -1.798***
(0.065) (0.175) (0.098) (0.130) (0.647) (0.219)
Foreign inflow λFrt × 1970s -0.346 -0.179
(0.259) (0.674)
Foreign inflow λFrt × 1980s -0.039 0.805
(0.170) (0.744)
Foreign inflow λFrt × 1990s -0.033 0.341
(0.193) (0.761)
Foreign inflow λFrt × 2000s -0.086 1.040
(0.219) (0.836)
Foreign inflow λFrt × post-80 0.179** 0.803**
(0.071) (0.327)
Controls and instruments As in column 2, Table 3 As in column 4, Table 3
Observations 3,610 3,610 3,610 3,610 3,610 3,610
This table estimates heterogeneity in IV conditional and unconditional crowd-out effects over time. Columns
1 and 4 replicate the basic IV specifications of Table 3 (columns 2 and 4); but I report only the coefficient on
foreign inflows. In columns 2 and 5, I include interactions between the foreign inflow and decade effects (my
additional instruments are interactions between the enclave shift-share and the same decade effects), with the
1960s interaction omitted. In columns 3 and 6, I include a single interaction between the foreign inflow and
a dummy for the 1980-2010 period (which I also interact with the enclave instrument). The specification is
otherwise identical to columns 2 and 4 of Table 3: see notes under that table for further details. Errors are
clustered by state, and robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Each observation is weighted by the
lagged local population share. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 6: Local adjustment to foreign inflows, for given π
π = 0 π = 0.197 π = 0.27 π = 0.4 π = 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. Conditional crowd-out δc1 0.913*** 0.880*** 0.868*** 0.845*** 0.743***
(0.065) (0.055) (0.051) (0.046) (0.043)
B. Unconditional crowd-out δu1 1.096*** 0.880*** 0.800*** 0.657*** 0
(0.130) (0.104) (0.095) (0.078) -
C. Crowd-out differential δc1 − δu1 -0.182** 0.000 0.068 0.188*** 0.743***
(0.082) (0.061) (0.053) (0.041) (0.043)






-0.245** 0.000 0.091 0.253*** 1
(0.102) (0.082) (0.074) (0.061) -







0.851*** 0.880*** 0.891*** 0.910*** 1
(0.056) (0.045) (0.041) (0.033) -







-0.149*** -0.120*** -0.109*** -0.090*** 0
(0.056) (0.045) (0.041) (0.033) -









1.288*** 1.000*** 0.898*** 0.722*** 0
(0.115) (0.093) (0.085) (0.071) -
This table quantifies a range of objects of interest, conditional on the (biased) coefficient estimates from the crowd-out
equations (δ̂c1, δ̂c2 and δ̂u2 ) and an assumed level of undercoverage bias, π. Using equations (31) and (32), I can compute
the "true" conditional crowd-out coefficients: δc1 = (1− π) δ̂c1 +πδ̂c2 and δc2 = δ̂c2. And using equation (29), I can compute
the "true" unconditional effect: δu1 = (1− π) δ̂u1 . The remaining objects are functions of the "true" δc1, δc2 and δu1 , as
specified in the table: see equation (18). Coefficient estimates of δ̂c1, δ̂c2 and δ̂u2 are based on the basic IV specifications
of Table 3 (columns 2 and 4). Robust standard errors (in parentheses), clustered by state, are computed using the delta
method and account for dependence between coefficient estimates across the conditional and unconditional crowd-out
equations. In practice, I account for this dependence by estimating a single model which nests both the conditional
and unconditional equations: I use a dataset with every observation duplicated, where every right hand variable (and
instrument) is interacted with dummy indicators for both the conditional and unconditional models. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 7: Robustness of unconditional IV crowd-out to controls and decade
1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s All years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(A) Controlling for year effects only 0.273 -0.726 -0.041 -0.943*** -0.538** -0.526**
(0.944) (0.635) (0.250) (0.225) (0.252) (0.246)
(B) + Current Bartik -0.745 -0.268 -0.455 -0.921*** -0.572** -0.689***
(1.134) (0.466) (0.350) (0.260) (0.251) (0.217)
(C) + Lagged log ER (instrumented) -0.709 -0.238 -0.744* -0.327 -0.564** -0.753***
(1.139) (0.318) (0.441) (0.421) (0.246) (0.239)
(D) + Climate controls -1.967** -2.088*** -0.973*** -1.343*** -0.845*** -1.396***
(0.908) (0.467) (0.302) (0.256) (0.180) (0.192)
(E) + Coastline dummy -2.032** -2.087*** -0.865** -1.119*** -0.637*** -1.263***
(0.947) (0.473) (0.350) (0.251) (0.189) (0.228)
(F) + Log pop density 1900 -1.657*** -1.797*** -0.726*** -1.100*** -0.558*** -1.107***
(0.610) (0.220) (0.201) (0.276) (0.215) (0.256)
(G) + Log distance to closest CZ -1.626** -1.917*** -0.877*** -1.203*** -0.638*** -1.137***
(0.634) (0.197) (0.188) (0.298) (0.236) (0.251)
(H) + Amenity×yr effects (i.e. all controls) -1.626** -1.917*** -0.877*** -1.203*** -0.638*** -1.096***
(0.634) (0.197) (0.188) (0.298) (0.236) (0.130)
(I) Native response only (all controls) -0.926* -1.873*** -0.751*** -0.870*** 0.101 -0.715***
(0.476) (0.190) (0.176) (0.302) (0.194) (0.127)
(J) Native response to total migrant stock -3.353 -1.988*** -0.842*** -1.220*** 0.315 -1.095***
(3.937) (0.253) (0.209) (0.438) (0.592) (0.204)
Observations 722 722 722 722 722 3,610
This table tests the robustness of my basic IV unconditional crowd-out effect (in column 4 of Table 3) to the choice of controls
and decadal sample. The first five columns estimate the effect of the foreign inflow λFrt separately by decade, and column 6
pools all decades. Moving down the rows of the table, I show how the crowd-out effect changes as progressively more controls
are included. All specifications include the foreign inflow λFrt (instrumented with the enclave shift-share, mrt) and year effects.
Row B controls additionally for a current Bartik, brt; row C includes the (endogenous) lagged employment rate (together with
its lagged Bartik instrument, brt−1); and the various amenities are then progressively added - until, in row H, I have the full set
of controls I use in Table 3. Row I replaces the dependent variable with the contribution of natives alone to local population
growth, using the full set of controls. Row J also estimates the native response (with the full set of controls), but replaces the
inflow of new migrants λFrt with the contribution of all migrants (i.e. including old migrants) to local population growth. I write










respectively (using the same functional
form as (23)), where LNrt and LMrt are respectively the local populations of natives and all foreign-born individuals. Errors are
clustered by state, and robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Each observation is weighted by the lagged local
population share. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 8: Within-CZ IV estimates of δw1
Pooled cross-sections Longitudinal Observations
First stage Total residual Natives First stage Total residual Natives
coefficient contrib: λIjrt only: λ
I,N
jrt coefficient contrib: λIjrt only: λ
I,N
jrt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
CG / < CG 0.539*** 1.502*** 1.638*** 0.475*** -3.587** -2.798** 4,332
(0.067) (0.295) (0.369) (0.074) (1.518) (1.244)
Coll / < Coll 0.662*** 1.040*** 1.046*** 0.778*** -1.129*** -0.794*** 4,332
(0.044) (0.132) (0.162) (0.056) (0.094) (0.140)
HSD / > HSD 0.785*** 0.980*** 1.410*** 0.841*** -0.425*** -0.252*** 4,332
(0.031) (0.088) (0.261) (0.039) (0.090) (0.067)
4 edu groups 0.744*** 1.330*** 1.521*** 0.817*** -0.194* -0.041 8,664
(0.035) (0.095) (0.209) (0.038) (0.117) (0.085)
This table reports within-area estimates of crowd-out (i.e. the coefficient on λFjrt, the negative of δw1 ) using equation (34). Columns
1-3 are based on pooled decadal cross-sections between 1970 and 2000, and columns 4-6 exploit longitudinal information on changes
in residence over 1975-1980, 1985-1990 and 1995-2000. Columns 1 and 4 report the first stage coefficients on the education-specific
enclave shift-share, mjrt. And the remaining columns report IV estimates of δw1 , both for the total residual contribution (natives
and old migrants) and for natives only. The four rows offer estimates for different education-based skill delineations: (i) college
graduates / non-graduates, (ii) at least one year of college / no college, (iii) high school dropouts / all others, and (iv) four groups:
high school dropouts, high school graduates, some college and college graduates. All specifications control for both CZ-year and
education-year interacted fixed effects. Errors are clustered by state, and robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Each
observation is weighted by the lagged cell-specific population share. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A1: IV effects of foreign inflows by education
Pop growth: Foreign Residual Employment rates Wages Housing costs
∆ljrt contrib: λFjrt contrib: λIjrt Native Migrant Native Migrant Rents Prices
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Coll grads -0.261* 0.816*** -0.977*** -0.042* -0.192*** 0.185** 0.319** 0.259** 0.625**
(0.159) (0.041) (0.184) (0.025) (0.057) (0.080) (0.157) (0.109) (0.278)
Non-grads -0.145 1.033*** -1.274*** -0.276*** -0.258*** -0.030 -0.088 0.020 0.321
(0.135) (0.011) (0.136) (0.069) (0.066) (0.130) (0.084) (0.109) (0.291)
This table reports IV effects of the aggregate-level foreign inflow λFrt in equation (A27), estimated for various outcomes separately for
college graduates and non-graduates. All specifications include 3,610 observations (722 CZs over five decadal periods), with the exception
of column 5 (whose samples are 2,693 and 3,590 respectively), for the same reasons as discussed under Table 4. The right-hand side of
the estimating equation is identical to column 4 of Table 3; see table notes for details. Errors are clustered by state, and robust standard
errors are reported in parentheses. Each observation is weighted by the lagged local population share. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table A2: Contribution of inflows and outflows to crowding out across CZs
OLS IV












(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Foreign inflow: λF5rt -0.500 -0.296 0.147 -1.555*** -1.661*** -0.320
(0.319) (0.385) (0.152) (0.269) (0.388) (0.222)
Lagged 10yr ER: nrt−10 − lrt−10 0.199*** 0.162*** -0.016 0.556*** 0.758*** 0.285**
(0.047) (0.051) (0.033) (0.191) (0.179) (0.118)
Current decadal Bartik: brt 0.286** 0.400*** 0.161*** 0.442*** 0.566*** 0.190***
(0.126) (0.115) (0.047) (0.115) (0.120) (0.067)
SW F-stat for λF5rt - - - 88.92 88.92 88.92
SW F-stat for nrt−10 − lrt−10 - - - 26.37 26.37 26.37
Observations 2,166 2,166 2,166 2,166 2,166 2,166
This table offers OLS and IV estimates of the 5-year unconditional crowding out effect, based on equation
(A28), and disaggregates these into the (approximate) contributions from internal inflows and outflows. Variable
definitions and data sources are given in Section D. The flow data covers the intervals 1965-70, 1975-80, 1985-90
and 1995-2000. The 5-year foreign inflow is instrumented with a 5-year enclave shift-share in the IV specification,
based on settlement patterns five years previously. The log employment rate, lagged ten years (e.g. measured
at 1960 for the 1965-70 flow interval), is instrumented using a lagged decadal Bartik. I also control for a current
decadal Bartik, year effects and the amenity variables (interacted with year effects) described in Section 3. Errors
are clustered by state, and robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Each observation is weighted by
the 5-year lagged local population share. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A3: First stage for employment response
Log pop change: ∆lrt Foreign inflow: λFrt Net internal flows: λIrt Lagged ER: nrt−1 − lrt−1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Current enclave: mrt -0.073 0.922*** -1.030*** -0.022 -0.029
(0.139) (0.087) (0.174) (0.122) (0.124)
Max Jan temp 0.333*** 0.038** 0.314*** -0.141*** -0.139***
(0.057) (0.019) (0.062) (0.047) (0.045)
Current Bartik: brt 0.546*** 0.545*** 0.083*** 0.477*** -0.134* -0.122* -0.120*
(0.114) (0.114) (0.023) (0.124) (0.069) (0.069) (0.066)
Lagged Bartik: brt−1 0.286*** 0.283*** 0.069*** 0.237*** 0.371*** 0.359*** 0.362***
(0.060) (0.067) (0.020) (0.078) (0.063) (0.062) (0.062)
SW F-test 0.26 75.88 121.32 72.60 0.25 45.40 45.89
Amenity×yr controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Max temp jan×yr controls Yes No No No Yes No No
Year sample 60-10 60-10 60-10 60-10 60-10 60-10 60-10
Observations 3,610 3,610 3,610 3,610 3,610 3,610 3,610
This table reports first stage estimates for the employment response equations (A43) and (A44); corresponding OLS and IV estimates are in Table A4.
I report Sanderson-Windmeijer F-statistics which account for multiple endogenous variables. All specifications control for year effects and the amenity
variables (interacted with year effects) described in Section 3. However, I only include the maximum January temperature control (and year interactions)
in those specifications where it does not serve as an instrument. Errors are clustered by state, and robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Each observation is weighted by the lagged local population share. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table A4: OLS and IV estimates of employment response
OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pop growth: ∆lrt 1.025*** 4.000 0.735***
(0.013) (6.533) (0.066)
Foreign inflow: λFrt 0.870*** 0.605***
(0.030) (0.057)
Net internal flows: λIrt 0.994*** 0.776***
(0.015) (0.055)
Lagged ER: nrt−1 − lrt−1 -0.218*** -0.216*** -2.757 -0.280*** -0.273***
(0.023) (0.023) (5.197) (0.102) (0.090)
Current Bartik: brt 0.143*** 0.182*** -1.714 0.391*** 0.388***
(0.029) (0.020) (4.156) (0.070) (0.065)
Instruments - - mrt, brt−1 Jan temp, brt−1 mrt, Jan temp, brt−1
Amenity×yr controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Max temp jan×yr controls Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Year sample 60-10 60-10 60-10 60-10 60-10
Observations 3,610 3,610 3,610 3,610 3,610
This table reports OLS and IV estimates for models of local employment growth, i.e. equations (A43) and (A44).
Corresponding first stage estimates are in Table A3. All specifications control for year effects and the amenity
variables (interacted with year effects) described in Section 3. However, I only include the maximum January
temperature control (and year interactions) in those speciifcations where it does not serve as an instrument. Errors
are clustered by state, and robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Each observation is weighted by the
lagged local population share. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A5: Robustness of crowd-out estimates to CZ sample and geographical units
Basic specification Without lagged emp rate control
Basic CZ Top 100 Excluding top 5 Excluding Unweighted Basic CZ State CZ data +
sample CZs destination CZs mrt > 0.1 sample data state FEs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Foreign inflow: λFrt -1.096*** -1.018*** -0.866*** -0.989*** -0.940*** -0.787*** -0.936** -0.931***
(0.130) (0.129) (0.202) (0.220) (0.266) (0.167) (0.372) (0.127)
Lagged ER: nrt−1 − lrt−1 0.831*** 0.887 0.667*** 0.781*** 0.578***
(0.207) (0.572) (0.168) (0.220) (0.183)
Current Bartik: brt 0.677*** 0.669*** 0.770*** 0.653*** 0.604*** 0.524*** 0.104 0.699***
(0.099) (0.172) (0.088) (0.097) (0.106) (0.119) (0.238) (0.083)
Lagged Bartik: brt−1 0.290*** 0.319*** 0.228***
(0.060) (0.108) (0.059)
Lagged enclave: mrt−1 -0.388*** -0.482** -0.063
(0.124) (0.221) (0.080)
Instruments mrt, brt−1 mrt, brt−1 mrt, brt−1 mrt, brt−1 mrt, brt−1 mrt mrt mrt
F-stat for λFrt 126.47 99.91 127.68 62.51 51.13 106.79 299.94 40.72
F-stat for nrt−1 − lrt−1 34.70 3.48 30.74 34.13 25.77 - - -
Amenity×yr controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geography CZ CZ CZ CZ CZ CZ State CZ
Observations 3,610 500 3,585 3,544 3,610 3,610 240 3,610
This table offers alternative IV estimates of unconditional crowd-out in equation (27), for different CZ samples, weighting choices, and also state-
level data: see Appendix F.2 and F.3 for details. Columns 1 and 6 are identical to columns 4 and 6 respectively of Table 3. Column 2 restricts the
sample to the 100 largest CZs (based on population of 16-64s in 1960). Column 3 excludes the five CZs with largest (absolute) migrant inflows,
namely Los Angeles, New York, Chicago, Miami and San Francisco. Column 4 restricts the sample to observations with enclave shift-share mrt
values below 0.1. Column 5 reproduces the basic column 1 specification without population weights. Columns 6-8 replace the lagged employment
rate on the right-hand side with the lagged Bartik and enclave shift-shares. Column 7 replicates column 6 for state-level data: the sample consists
of the 48 states of the continental US, with the District of Columbia merged into Maryland. Column 8 controls for state fixed effects in the CZ-level
specification of column 6. All specifications control for the current Bartik brt, year effects and the amenity variables (interacted with year effects)
described in Section 3. Errors are clustered by state, and robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Each observation is weighted by the
lagged local population share (with the exception of column 5). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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∆Lrt − LFrt ∆Lrt − LFrt λIrt λIrt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)








Foreign inflow: LFrt -0.228*** -0.971***
(0.085) (0.273)
Lagged ER: nrt−1 − lrt−1 0.831*** 0.893*** 0.992*** 0.888*** 2×106*** 4×106** 1.269**
(0.207) (0.227) (0.193) (0.203) (7×105) (2×106) (0.496)
Current Bartik: brt 0.677*** 0.791*** 0.843*** 0.788*** 2×105 -2×105 0.615*** 0.580***
(0.099) (0.116) (0.123) (0.124) (3×105) (2×105) (0.086) (0.080)
Lagged Bartik: brt−1 0.162***
(0.063)
Lagged enclave: mrt−1 0.078
(0.119)








, brt−1 ΛFrt, brt−1 ΛFrt, brt−1 ΛFrt, brt−1 mrt, brt−1 mrt
F-stat for λFrt 126.47 116.05 33.87 91.63 262.07 92.07 58.33 40.30
F-stat for nrt−1 − lrt−1 34.70 34.99 45.13 40.63 39.10 49.08 45.51 -
Amenity×yr controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
CZ fixed effects No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,610 3,610 3,610 3,610 3,610 3,610 3,610 3,610
This table offers alternative IV estimates of unconditional crowd-out in equation (27), for different empirical specifications: see Appendix
F.4, F.5 and F.6 for details. The dependent variable in each specification is reported in the field above the column number. The instruments
I use in each specification are reported at the bottom of the table. Column 1 is identical to columns 4 of Table 3 in the main text. In column



















o(−r)t is the predicted number of incoming migrants between t − 1 and t). Column 3 then replaces the instrument with
ΛF 60rt
Lrt−1






o(−r)t predicts the migrant inflow based on 1960 settlement patterns, φor60 (rather than t − 1 patterns), for
every decade. Column 4 replaces the instrument with ΛFrt, i.e. the predicted absolute (rather than relative) foreign inflow. Columns 5 and
6 are based on the levels specification in (A51). Columns 6-8 control for CZ fixed effects. Column 8 replaces the lagged employment rate
on the right-hand side with the lagged Bartik and enclave shift-shares. The Sanderson-Windmeijer (2016) F-statistics account for multiple
endogenous variables. All specifications control for the current Bartik brt, year effects and the amenity variables (interacted with year effects)
described in Section 3. Errors are clustered by state, and robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Each observation is weighted
by the lagged local population share. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A7: State-level within-area IV estimates of δw1 : Cohort effects
First stage Total response Native response by: Observations





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CG / < CG 0.604*** 1.618*** 1.616** 2.222*** 288
(0.104) (0.357) (0.665) (0.425)
Coll / < Coll 0.821*** 1.230*** 1.206*** 2.265*** 288
(0.047) (0.155) (0.147) (0.208)
HSD / > HSD 0.970*** 1.088*** 1.434*** 1.619*** 288
(0.033) (0.130) (0.344) (0.249)
4 edu groups 0.933*** 1.328*** 1.483*** 1.763*** 576
(0.032) (0.104) (0.247) (0.195)
This table explores the presence of cohort effects in the pooled cross-section IV estimates of δw1 in equation (34),
using state-level data and a range of education-based skill delineations. My sample consists of the 48 states of the
continental US, with the District of Columbia merged into Maryland. Columns 1-3 are state-level equivalents to the
CZ estimates in Table 8 (columns 1-3) in the main text, based on the three decadal periods between 1970 and 2000.
Column 1 reports the first stage coefficient on the education-specific enclave shift-share, mjrt. Column 2 reports the
IV effect of skill-specific foreign inflows λ̂Fjrt on the total residual contribution λIjrt (natives and old migrants) to skill
group g population growth in state r. Column 3 reports the contribution of natives only, i.e. λI,Njrt . Column 5 then
replaces the dependent variable with the contribution of natives to group-specific population growth among those born
(rather than residing) in state r. All specifications control for both area-year and skill-year interacted fixed effects.
Errors are clustered by state, and robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Each observation is weighted
by the lagged cell-specific population share. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A8: Reconciliation with aggregate-level estimates from Card (2007)
Card (2009): Replication
top 100 MSAs Top 100 CZs All CZs






0.5 0.118 -0.533 -0.487 -1.145* -1.055*** -1.115*** -1.034***
(0.4) (0.225) (0.339) (0.318) (0.668) (0.291) (0.416) (0.256)
Log population in 1980 ? -0.044*** 0.751*** 0.006
(?) (0.011) (0.161) (0.019)
Log population in 1970 -0.732***
(0.145)
Current Bartik 1.850*** 1.456*** 1.433*** 1.356***






-0.8 -0.197 -1.066* -1.285*** -1.154*** -1.104*** -1.164* -1.331***
(0.6) (0.234) (0.636) (0.371) (0.398) (0.321) (0.630) (0.239)
Log population in 1980 ? -0.049*** 0.667*** 0.004
(?) (0.008) (0.254) (0.024)
Log population in 1970 -0.662***
(0.236)
Current Bartik -0.578 0.590 0.577 0.770**
(0.586) (0.540) (0.522) (0.308)
Amenity controls No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 722
This table offers a reconciliation with Card’s (2007) aggregate-level IV estimates of crowd-out, based on equation (A52). See Appendix G for




; and the regressor




. Card’s IV estimates are presented in column 1, separately for the 1980s in Panel A and the 1990s
in Panel B. These are taken from Table 3 of his paper, based on the 100 largest MSAs, with observations weighted by 1980 populations. (Card
reports his estimates as the effect on aggregate population growth, but I substract 1 from his numbers for comparability with my specification;
see Peri and Sparber, 2011.) Card controls for 1980 population, but does not report the coefficient: hence the "?". In column 2, I replicate his
exercise using a sample of the largest 100 CZs. Columns 3-7 study the effects of including or excluding various control variables, with columns
6-7 including the amenity effects described in Section 3. Column 8 extends the sample to all 722 CZs. Robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A9: Reconciliation with within-area estimates from Card (2001)
Card (2001): Replication ... with errors ... excluding ... with ... with ... with alternative
175 MSAs, clustered demog remaining full area specification for
weighted by state controls MSAs sample flow variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: OLS
6 occup groups 0.25*** 0.214*** 0.214** -0.071 -0.181*** -0.230*** -0.267***
(0.04) (0.045) (0.098) (0.046) (0.055) (0.067) (0.072)
2 occup groups - 0.106 0.106 -0.486*** -0.801*** -0.942*** -1.036***
(0.185) (0.248) (0.145) (0.244) (0.287) (0.299)
Coll grad / non-grad - -0.153 -0.153 -1.948*** -3.270*** -3.595*** -3.878***
(0.441) (0.572) (0.549) (1.124) (1.099) (1.145)
Panel B: IV
6 occup groups 0.25*** 0.255*** 0.255** -0.054 -0.123*** -0.169*** -0.192***
(0.05) (0.045) (0.115) (0.043) (0.044) (0.051) (0.053)
2 occup groups - 0.244* 0.244 -0.469*** -0.653*** -0.809*** -0.895***
(0.139) (0.298) (0.100) (0.109) (0.138) (0.141)
Coll grad / non-grad - 0.563 0.563 -2.143*** -1.687* -2.350** -2.615***
(1.280) (2.912) (0.750) (0.867) (0.927) (0.949)
This table offers a reconciliation with Card’s (2001) within-area estimates of crowd-out, based on equation (A53). See Appendix H for




), for his six-group imputed occupation
scheme, are presented in the top row (in each panel) of column 1. These are taken from Table 4 of his paper, based on the 175 largest
MSAs of the 1990 census extract, with observations weighted by cell populations. (Card reports his estimates as the effect on aggregate
population growth within the cell, but I substract 1 from his numbers for comparability with my specification; see Peri and Sparber, 2011.)
I attempt to replicate his results in column 2. In columns 3, I cluster standard errors by state. Column 4 excludes the demographic controls
from the regression. Column 5 extends the geographical sample to all identifiable MSAs (raising the total to 320), and column 6 extends
it to cover 49 additional regions consisting of the non-metro areas in each state (so 369 areas in total). Finally, column 7 replaces the left










respectively, applying the functional form I use in the
main text. I present estimates for both Card’s six-group imputed occupation scheme (top row), a broader two-group imputed occupation
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Employment elasticity: η
Figure 1: Implied relationship between π and η
This figure plots the relationship between undercoverage bias π and the employment elasticity η, implied by equation
(33). I calibrate this equation using estimates from Table 3 (columns 2 and 4): specifically, δ̂c1 = 0.913, δ̂c2 = 0.743 and
δ̂u1 = 1.096. The shaded area illustrates 95% confidence intervals (for fixed values of η): standard errors are computed
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Coeff: −1.096 (.148), R2: .115, N: 3610
IV
Figure A1: Graphical illustration of crowding out estimates
This figure presents Frisch-Waugh type plots for the unconditional crowd-out estimates in columns 3 and 4 of Table 3. See
Appendix F.1 for details.
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